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I. INTRODUCTION
The tension between the rule of law and the discretion of administrative
agencies to implement statutory schemes has long been recognized.' When
1. See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency
Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 434 (1999). The discussion about agency discretion subsumes
courts review the legal interpretations of administrative agencies, the scope
of such judicial power of review represents a complex issue and "it is also a
source of fragmentation on the [United States] Supreme Court, dividing its
members in a variety of different regulatory contexts."' Rules determining
the appropriate deference to be accorded to agency decisions have a broad
impact because hundreds of federal agencies are in existence, and 'agency'
is broadly defined to mean "each authority of the Government of the United
States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency." 3
With the passage of time, the role of the courts has changed. Originally,
courts had an antagonistic role with respect to agencies and focused on the
protection of personal rights. Eventually, courts "lost their antagonism to
agencies," still defending people's rights, although in a less demanding way,
and adopting a deferential standard of review of agencies' decisions.
other issues such as: a) the extent to which agencies can set policy, b) the freedom of agencies to
deviate from an established policy in particular circumstances, and c) whether agency discretion is
plenary rather than subject to supervision. Id. at 432.
2. Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of
Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1108 (2001) (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000) (where eight of the justices "agreed that Chevron applied, but
disagreed on their assessment of the context of Congress' delegation of authority to the Food and
Drug Administration to regulate cigarettes under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.")).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1996). However, the rule expressly provides that the following are not
considered as agencies for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act: the Congress; the courts of
the United States; the governments of the territories or possessions of the United States; the
government of the District of Columbia; or except as to the requirements of section 552 of this title:
agencies composed of representatives of the parties or of representatives of organizations of the
parties to the disputes determined by them; court martial and military commissions; military
authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory; or functions conferred by
sections 1738, 1739, 1743, and 1744 of title 12; chapter 2 of title 41; subchapter II of chapter 471 of
title 49; or sections 1884, 1891-1902, and former section 1641(b)(2), of title 50, appendix. Id. §§
551(l)(A)-(H) (1996). An alphabetical directory of existing federal agencies is available at the
internet address: http://www.lib.lsu.edu/gov/alpha (last visited Oct. 5, 2002). Contact information
for each federal agency is available at: http://www.firstgov.gov/Contact/ByAgency.shtml (last
visited Oct. 5, 2002).
4. William F. Funk, To Preserve Meaningful Judicial Review, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 171 (1997)
(citing as an example of such role the Court's decision in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29
(1942) (holding that Congress may regulate the amount that wheat farmers may grow for own
consumption through Commerce Clause because of the cumulative effect that consumption has on
wheat prices)).
5. Id. at 171-72. See also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94-95 (1943) (holding that if the
action of an administrative agency rests upon a determination involving an exercise of judgment in
an area which Congress has entrusted to the agency, that action may not be set aside because the
reviewing court might have made a different determination were it empowered to do so); cf
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491-92 (1951) (holding that "[w]hether on the
record as a whole there is substantial evidence to support findings of [National Labor Relations
Board] is a question which Congress has placed in the keeping of the Courts of Appeals," and thus,
the Court will intervene only in the "rare instance when the standard appears to have been
misapprehended or grossly misapplied."). Such cases can be considered as the progenitors of the
strong deferential review of agencies' decisions established in Chevron. See Funk, supra note 4, at
171-172.
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In the 1960s and 1970s, the courts assumed a more active role in the
administrative process, aiming at its improvement and expansion. 6  In
Skidmore, a decision that can be fairly intended as the main step towards an
increased cooperation between agencies and courts in the administrative
process, the Court required agencies to convince the reviewing courts about
the persuasiveness of their determinations.7
However, Skidmore had a limited impact,8 and with the dissolution of
the notion of collaboration between courts and agencies, the Court
established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.9 a strong deferential standard of review for the agencies' decisions.
In fact, in Chevron, the Court instructed courts to defer to agency
interpretations of law, maintaining that when a statute is silent or
ambiguous, "the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of statute" and therefore the court "may
not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision" in lieu of a
reasonable interpretation made by the agency.'0 The Court's decision in
Chevron is representative of the post-modernist view of the role of the
judicial power in the administrative process."
The Court, in its decision in United States v. Mead Corp.,'2 has recently
revisited and redefined the relationship between Skidmore and Chevron
deference, and the related standards of review.' 3 In Mead Corp., the Court
6. Id. at 172. In Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., the Court held that some provisions in the
Administrative Procedure Act were inapplicable in the circumstances and imposed new requirements
on informal agency action. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 756-
57 (1972). During this period, the courts also expanded the scope of the protected rights and of the
injuries justifying judicial remedies. See Funk, supra note 4, at 173. In addition, the Court
expanded the scope of application and appropriateness of judicial review, including pre-enforcement
review. See id. at 173-74.
7. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 138-40 (1944). The Court provided that the
weight to be accorded to an agency's interpretation will depend "upon the thoroughness evident in
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade". Id. at 140.
8. See Rossi, supra note 2, at 1129.
9. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
10. Id. at 843-44.
I1. See Funk, supra note 4, at 174-75. Post-modemists agree that the role of the judiciary should
be minimized but are split on the solutions: a) some, including Justice Scalia, aim at recognizing and
embracing the political interests involved in the regulatory policymaking, arguing that the
administrative process should be political; b) others see administrative regulation as a technocratic
endeavor. See id. at 175-76. Both consider the administrative process as not well suited for judicial
review. Id.
12. 533U.S.218(2001).
13. See id. The dispute involved in this case arose because Mead Corp. imported "day planners"
held that administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision
qualifies for Chevron deference only when it appears that "Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rulings carrying the
force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority."' 4 The Court held that "a very
good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment [is] express
congressional authorizations" to engage in notice and comment rulemaking
or formal adjudication.' 5 After denying Chevron deference to the Customs'
ruling letter at issue, the Court, however, indicated that this does not mean
that the classification rulings are outside of any deference. In fact, Chevron
did nothing to eliminate Skidmore's deference.' 6 Importantly, the Court also
held that Chevron deference is proper, although no notice-and-comment
authority is required or afforded, when Congress intends an agency to have
such authority.' 7 Such provisions are especially relevant at present time
because the increasing concern for national security after the September 11 th
attacks and the related demand for enhanced discretion of law enforcement
agencies could lead the courts to an expansive use of this "escape clause,"
thereby considerably diminishing the impact of the Court's decision in Mead
Corp.'
8
in to the United States, which for many years Customs had classified as "duty free." See id.
However, pursuant to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule Act, the Customs Headquarters later issued a
"ruling letter" classifying the items as "bound diaries" subject to a tariff. See id.
14. See id at 226-227. The delegation of legislative authority to the agency that gives rise to
Chevron deference need not be express, but rather, there are situations where it is apparent or
implied from the agency's generally conferred authority that Congress expects the agency to speak
with the force of law and therefore Chevron deference is appropriate. See id. at 229.
15. See id. at 229-30.
16. See id. at 234. The court held that Chevron deference was not warranted in this case because
the Customs' process in making such ruling letters is far removed from notice and comment
rulemaking process and from "any other circumstances reasonably suggesting that Congress ever
thought of classification rulings" as deserving Chevron deference. Id. at 231. The Court reasoned
that "to claim that classifications have legal force is to ignore the reality that 46 different Customs
offices issue 10,000 to 15,000 of them each year." Id. at 233. Even if the classification in this case
had been made by a Headquarter, and was supported by developed reasoning, there is no indication
that because of that it might have a stronger force. See id. at 233-34. The Court stated that there is
room for a Skidmore claim when like here the regulatory scheme is highly detailed. See id.
Therefore, a classification ruling in this situation may at least seek a respect proportional to the
power to persuade. Id. at 235.
17. See id. at 231 (citing NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S.
251, 256-57 (1995) (holding that the Comptroller of the Currency is charged with the enforcement of
banking laws to an extent that Chevron deference is warranted with respect to his deliberative
conclusions as to the meaning of these laws)).
18. Such increasing demand for enhanced national security and agency discretion was clearly
underlined by the United States Attorney General John Ashcroft, who after the September I 1
'h
attacks proposed changes to wiretapping and detention laws. He stated in front of a Congressional
Committee that ""[e]very day that passes with outdated statutes and the old rules of engagement is a
day that terrorists have a competitive advantage '. . .'[u]ntil Congress makes those changes, we are
fighting an unnecessarily uphill battle."' John lbbitson & Campbell Clark, The War on Terror:
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This Case Note is intended to analyze the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Mead Corp. and its potential future impact on the judicial
review of agencies' decisions. Part II examines the historical background of
the case law regarding the judicial review of agencies' decisions.' 9 Part III
analyzes Justice Souter's opinion of the Court and Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion.2 ° Part IV considers the direct impact of the Mead Corp. decision on
the power of review of the courts, the indirect impact on the agencies'
activities, the shift of the burden of proof that is provided, the importance of
the "escape clause" created by the Court's decision, and, finally, the impact
on the relationship between the Charming Betsy canon and the Chevron
doctrine.2' Part V concludes this Case Note with final considerations on the
relevance of the Court's decision in Mead Corp.
22
Canada and U.S. Tighten Borders, GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 26, 2001, at Al. In the wake of the attacks
and in such direction of enhanced agency discretion in the law enforcement field, Congress has
approved the "Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001," which, among others, has as a
stated purpose to "enhance law enforcement investigatory tools." "Uniting and Strengthening
America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). Such concern is not only
expressed at the national level through an increase in powers and resources of law enforcement
agencies, but also by the state administrations, even in a moment of financial deficit for the states.
In his last state of the State address, Governor of California Gray Davis "outlined the increase in
security measures he has taken to guard state bridges, waterways, highways and airports since the
terrorist attacks of Sept. I I." Bill Ainsworth, Budget Shortfall Tests Davis Governor Pledges to Put
State's Finances in Order Without a Tax Increase, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Jan. 9, 2002, at
Al. The relationship between increased discretion of law enforcement agencies and a higher
national security level has often been stressed by the Heads of the law enforcement agencies
involved, and lately United States Attorney General John Ashcroft reasserted, after the federal Grand
Jury indictment of terrorist Richard Reid, the "shoe-bomber" of the American Airlines Flight 63
from Paris to Miami, that
"[a]s was the case with the charges filed against John Walker Lindh yesterday our ability
to prosecute terrorists has been greatly enhanced by the USA Patriot Act and thanked
Congress for passing the law which allowed Reid to be charged with a terrorism count for
allegedly attempting to wreck the airplane.
Wayne Washington, Suspect in Bomb Attempt Indicted. New Charges Allege Ties To At Qaeda, THE
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 17, 2002, at Al. It is evident, therefore, that the probability that concerns for
national security will be used to justify Chevron strong deference to agency decisions, even where
Congress did not expressly provide for through notice and comment authority or formal
adjudication, is real and might lead through the liberal use of the "escape clause" in Mead Corp. in a
field where the potential encroachment of individual rights is very high.
19. See infra Part 11.
20. See infra Part Ill.
2 1. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Part V.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Skidmore Deference
Administrative agencies make varying interpretive choices, whether or
not the Congress has delegated authority to elucidate a specific provision.23
The level of deference that should be accorded to such decisions "has been
understood to vary with the circumstances" and historically, in order to
reach such determination, courts have looked at diversified factors such as
the degree of the agency's care, its consistency, its formality, and its
expertness.24 Such debate has produced a spectrum of judicial responses
varying from great respect on one side, to substantial deference and to
indifference at the far end.
The Court's decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.26 summed up these
various approaches, thus providing a more uniform framework for the
courts' determination.27 The Skidmore case involved an action brought by
seven employees against their employer under the the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA). 28 The plaintiffs were employed by defendant in a packing plant
and they orally agreed to remain in the fire hall of the company for three to
four nights a week beyond their daytime employment, with the duty to
answer alarms in case of a fire or a sprinkler set off due to some other
reason.29 The issue was whether such waiting time constituted working time
for purposes of the statute.3"
The court held that "no principle in the statute or in Court decisions
precludes waiting time from also being working time."'" The court noted
that the responsibility of deciding whether or not a case falls within the
23. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 227.
24. See id. at 228 (citing General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976) (considering the
thoroughness of the agency's consideration); Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402,417
(1993) (considering the consistency of an agency's position); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 60-61
(1995) (holding that an internal agency guideline is only entitled to "some deference" insofar as its
interpretation was a permissible construction of the statute)).
25. Mead Corp, 533 U.S. at 228 (citing Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples'
Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 389-90 (1984); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 212-
213 (1988)).
26. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
27. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 228.
28. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 135-36. The action was brought under 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. The
employees tried to recover overtime, liquidated damages and attorney's fees. Id.
29. Id. During such periods no fire occurred and the company provided the workers with a
heating system, air conditioning, a recreation area and sleeping facilities. Id. at 136.
30. Id. at 136-38.
31. Id. at 136. The Court noted that it is a fact intensive inquiry that requires scrutinizing the
agreement between the parties, the nature of the service and the surrounding circumstances. Id. at
137.
730
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statute is a decsion for the courts.32 However, Congress created the Office
of the Administrator, which can bring injunctions to restrain violations of the
FLSA and has set forth interpretations of the application of the FLSA under
different cirucmstances in an interpretative bulletin and in informal rulings.33
As to the issue before the Court, the office of the administrator thought
that a flexible, rather than rigid, solution was required.34 According to the
agency's interpretation, the sleeping time and eating time of the employees
should have been excluded but the other time spent on call, even though
spent in recreative ways, should have been considered working time under
the FLSA.35
The Court specifically inquired about the measure of deference that is
appropriate to the Office of the Administrator's opinions. The Court noted
that the the agency's findings are not reached as a result of adversary
proceedings, and thus are not conclusive on the cases to which they either
directly or indirectly relate, and therefore are not binding on a District
Court.36 Importantly the Court pointed out that "[c]ongress did not utilize
the services of an administrative agency to find facts and to determine in the
first instance whether particular cases fall within or without the Act" but
instead, "it put this responsibility on the courts. 37 It is evident from this
passage that the Supreme Court envisioned the role of the agency as
peripheral to the interpretive process, placing instead the courts as the center
of gravity of such a process and using congressional intent as the motivating
factor for such choice.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 136-38. The bulletin and the informal letters provide a guide for employers and
employees. See id. at 138.
34. id. The Office of the Administrator provided guidelines in his bulletin. The agency noted
that there are some occupations where periods of inactivity during the night are not considered
working time even though the worker is subject to call and that the answer depends ."upon the
degree to which the employee is free to engage in personal activities during periods of idleness when
he is subject to call ... without being required to perform active work."' Id. The agency's reasoning
and method of analysis give further light on the importance in this area of law of deference to
agency's decisions of the need of flexibility. It is a strongly perceived need because of the fact
intensive inquiries in which agencies are often involved and such concern for flexibility has been at
the origin of the Court's decision in Chevron.
35. Id. at 138-140. The Office of the Administrator reasoned that such time on call, even if
pleasurably spent, was not spent in ways that they would have chosen had they been free to do so.
Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 136-138.
However, the Court recognized that this does not mean that the agency's
ruling at issue is not entitled to deference at all.38 The Court reasoned that
the Office of the Administrator acts pursuant to an official duty, has a
specialized experience, and operates on the basis of "broader investigations
and information than is likely to come to a judge in a particular case. 39
Furthermore the necessity of good administration of the FLSA, as well as
effective judicial administration, require that the standards for public
enforcement and those for the determination of the private rights be justified
by very good reasons.40
The Court held that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the
Office of the Administrator are not controlling on the courts but constitute a
body of experience and informed judgment that are proper guidance for the
courts in their determination. 4' Their weight will depend on their
thoroughness of considerations, validity of reasoning, consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and persuasiveness.42 Accordingly, the
Court held that the waiting time could have been considered working time
and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with such intepretation of
the FLSA.43
To understand the rationale of the Court's decision in Skidmore it is
important to consider that the assessment of the "persuasiveness" of an
agency's legal interpretation is separate from the inquiry about the Agency's
"power to persuade. 4  In fact, such interpretations under Skidmore are not
controlling because of their authority.45 However, they may be persuasive
because of their institutional source which because of its expertise,
specialized experience, or high level of information deserves judicial
deference according to the persuasiveness of its findings.46
38. See id
39. Id. at 139.
40. Id. It is clear from the Court's reasoning that it was concerned and conscious of the better
capability and expertise that agencies usually enjoy in the determinations relevant to the Court's
inquiry.
41. Id
42. Id. Under the Skidmore test a court must look at thoroughness, logic, and expertness of the
agency's interpretation and whether it fits any prior interpretations and any other sources of weight.
See Mead Corp, 533 U.S. at 235. Justice Scalia strongly criticizes the Skidmore test because it
resembles "the old totality of the circumstances test." Id. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He argues
that while Skidmore deference was fine earlier times, in the modem world it can only bring to
unpredictability, uncertainty, and endless litigation, due to the numerous federal agencies existing
today. Id. at 250.
43. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. The court remanded for such determination to the District
Court based upon the reasoning that the District Court in deciding the case had been guided by the
erroneous understanding that waiting time can never be working time under the law. Id.
44. Rossi, supra note 2, at 1134.
45. Id
46. Id.
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However, in the framework of judicial deference envisioned under
Skidmore, the central role in the process of statutory interpretation is still left
to the courts, which represent the center of gravity in such a process. This
explains why Skidmore deference is referred to as "weak deference." 7
B. Chevron Deference
The Court's decision in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. (Chevron)4' embodies the idea of a highly deferential
judicial review of Agency action.49 Such decisions and the related judicial
review system, so prone to meeting the flexibility needs of agencies, found
as progenitors several decisions issued in the 1940s and early 1950s.50
The Chevron decision clearly put an end to the notion that the
administrative process was a "collaborative enterprise"5' in which courts and
agencies could have an equal role. From this perspective, Chevron
represents the victory of post-modemism and its effort to minimize the
judicial role of administrative regulation.52 With respect to the limitation of
47. Id. at 1118. The Court's decision in Skidmore, as to such weak deference, resembles two
precedent cases. Id. (citing United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns., 310 U.S. 534, 549 (1933)
(holding that the interpretation of the meaning of statutes, as applied to justifiable controversies, is
exclusively a judicial function); Norwegian Nitrogen Products, Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294,
322-23 (1933) (holding that Tariff Commission cannot fix meaning of words as used by Congress or
courts, but has power to interpret its own rules and phrases contained in them).
48. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
49. Funk, supra note 4, at 172.
50. Id. (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94-95 (1943) (holding that if the action of an
administrative agency rests upon a determination involving the exercise of judgment in an area
which Congress has entrusted to the agency, that action may not be set aside because the reviewing
court might have made a different determination were it empowered to do so); Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491-92 (1951) (holding that
"[w]hether on the record as a whole there is substantial evidence to support agency
findings [of the National Labor Relations Board] is a question which Congress has placed
in the keeping of the Courts of Appeals. This Court will intervene only in what ought to
be the rare instance when the standard appears to have been misapprehended or grossly
misapplied)).
51. Funk, supra note 4, at 174.
52. See id. at 175. Post modernists, although united in the idea that the paramount goal is the
limitation of the judicial role, are divided into two groups: one is scholarly, while the other derives
from the judiciary. Under the scholarly point of view of post-modemism, judicial review is seen as
counter-productive because it only contributes to the judicialization of the administrative process and
interferes with the completion of the agencies' objectives. Id. The judicial prong of post-modernism,
of which Justice Scalia is an advocate, argues that the purpose of judicial review is to guarantee
individual rights and not to assure fidelity of the law, as that is the executive's job. Id.; see also
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
Post-modernists are additionally split on the solution for the future. See Funk, supra note 4, at 176.
powers that Chevron imposes on courts, Chevron has been described as "the
'counter-Marbury' for the administrative state. 53
The Chevron decision arose out of a dispute over the interpretation of a
provision in the Clean Air Act by the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).54 After several states had not achieved the
national air quality standards previously set forth by the EPA, in 1977,
Congress required non-complying states to establish a permit program
regulating "new or modified stationary sources" of air pollution.55 In order
to issue such permits, several stringent requirements had to be met. 6 In the
following years, the term "stationary source" was interpreted by the EPA to
preclude the use of a plantwide definition, thus imposing even higher
burdens on the non-complying states.57 However, in 1981, after a new
administration took office, the EPA issued a new regulation implementing
the permit requirement created by Congress, adopting a plantwide definition
of the terms "stationary source" and interpreting such term to include, for
pollution purposes, "the same industrial grouping as though they [single
polluting devices] were encased within a single bubble., 58
After the issuance of the EPA regulations, respondent, National
Resource Defense Council, filed a petition for review in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.5 9 The Court of
Appeals disagreed with the EPA's statutory interpretation, and thus set aisde
the regulations as contrary to the law.60 The Court of Appeals held that the
Some, including Justice Scalia, strive to recognize and embrace the political interests involved in
regulatory policymaking, and feel that this process should be political and is not suited for judicial
review. Id. Others, including Justice Breyer, see regulation as a technocratic thing, that should be
left to the experts and rather than to a judge. See id. at 176.
53. Rossi, supra note 2, at 1108. The decision has been so described because in Marbury v.
Madison, Justice Marshall exhorted that it is "the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is." Id. at 1114 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (1955) (containing pollution prevention and control provisions).
55. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 840. A stationary source was defined by Congress as "any
building, structure, facility or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant subject to
regulation under the Act." 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6)(1955). The Act defines a "building, structure,
facility or installation" as "all of the pollutant emitting activities which belong to the same industrial
grouping, are located on one or more contiguous or adjacent properties, and are under the control of
the same person (or persons under common control) except the activities of a vessel." 40 C.F.R. §§
51.18 )(I )(i)(ii)(1983).
56. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 840.
57. Id. at 839.
58. Id. at 840. The permit program created by Congress and to which the definition of
"stationary source" related had the purpose of accomodating the conflict between economic and
environmental interests. See id.
59. Id. at 841. The petition for review was filed directly in the Court of Appeals pursuant to
statutory authorization under 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1) (1955) (regarding
administrative proceedings and judicial review of administrative decisions issued pursuant to the
Clean Air Act).
60. See Nat'l Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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bubble concept was "inappropriate" to programs that were enacted for the
purpose of improving the quality of the air.61 The court reasoned that neither
the Clean Air Act nor its legislative history provided a precise definition of
"stationary source" for purposes of the permit program.62 Consequently, the
Court of Appeals emphasized that according to its interpretation, the purpose
of the Clean Air Act was to improve the quality of the air.63 Relying on two
of its prior decisions, the Court reasoned that although the bubble concept is
usable in programs designed to maintain present levels of quality in the air,
it is not usable when a program such as the Clean Air Act, is aimed at
improving it.64 Following the decision of the Court of Appeals, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider this issue.65
In Chevron, the Supreme Court, according to general principles of
interpretation, recognized that when Congress "has directly spoken" to the
question at issue, both agencies and courts are bound by the statutory
interpretation provided by the legislature.66 However, the Court in Chevron
held that when Congress has not directly addressed "the precise question at
issue," or an ambiguity is present, the courts cannot merely impose their
own construction of a statute on an agency.67 The Court clearly held that in
such a case, the proper inquiry is not whether the court agrees with the
agency's solution, but rather "whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute. 68
The Court recognized that agency authority to fill in the gap in statutory
schemes through its own interpretation can originate by either an express or
an implied delegation of powers by Congress.69 The Court held that agency
regulations emanate pursuant to express delegation of power to interpret a
statutory provision, and thus must be given "controlling weight unless they
are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. 7v  With
61. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. 840, 841-42 (1984).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id. (citing Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 396-97 (1979)(holding that the
EPA must employ a scheme designed to maintain air quality in clean areas); ASARCO Inc. v. EPA,
578 F.2d 323, 327-329 (1979)(declaring that the bubble concept was impermissible when the
congressional objective was improvement, rather than simply preservation, of existing air quality).
65. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 842.
66. Id. at 842-43. If, following this preliminary inquiry, it is shown that Congress has directly
spoken on an issue, then both courts and agencies are prevented from adopting a non-conforming
interpretation.
67. Id. at 843.
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
70. Id. at 844 (citing United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834 (1984); Schweiker v. Gray
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respect to an implied delegation of authority, the Court provided that as long
as the statutory interpretation promulgated by an agency is reasonable, the
courts cannot substitute the agency's construction with their own.7
The Court justified providing such strong deference to the agencies'
interpretations in light of the enhanced expertise that the agencies enjoy in
the fields in which they operate.72  In fact, the Court expressly noted that
such deference has been especially warranted in the past whenever "a full
understanding of the force of the statutory policy has depended upon more
than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency
regulations. 73
As to the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Court held that the lower
court had adopted a judicial definition of the term "stationary source" that
was too static in nature.74 The Court determined that the lower court
misconceived its role because once it determined that Congresss left a gap as
to the applicability of the bubble concept, the proper question should have
been whether the agency's view was reasonable rather than whether the
court agreed with such an interpretation.75 The Court reasoned that although
Congress did not specificially intend to apply the "bubble" concept in those
cases, the use of that concept by the EPA was permissible.
7 6
Under the Court's opinion such use was permissible and reasonable
because the single items defined in Paragraph 1 1(a)(3) of the Clean Air Act
as being part of a "stationary source" could reasonably imply a bubble
concept: each item is enumerated as if it were encased in a bubble.77
Accordingly, the Court again stressed the special importance of the
Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981)).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. (citing INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 (1981); Train v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 87 (1975)).
74. Id. at 845. Through this consideration, the Court impliedly recognizes that one of the
functions of agencies is to interpret statutory terms not in a static manner but according to the
evolving circumstances in which its application is required.
75. See id. The question was not whether the bubble concept was appropriate in the judgment of
the Court of Appeals. Instead, the Court of Appeals considered the term "source" so flexibly as to
cover either a plant-wide definition, a "unit within a plant" definition, or a dual definition applicable
to both a bubble and its components. See id. at 859. It then interpreted the policies to mandate a
plant-wide definition. Id. This reasoning is clearly wrong under the test created by the Court in
Chevron where at least, if an agency interpretation is reasonable, the court must defer to it.
76. Id. at 866. The Court reasoned that there was no specific intent on the part of the Congress
because, like the Court of Appeals, it found that both the statute and its legislative history were silent
as to this application of the bubble concept. Id. at 862. Furthermore the Court recognized that the
EPA interpretation was consistent with the allowance of a reasonable economic growth, which
represented a policy concern that the legislative history "plainly identifies." Id. at 862-63.
77. Id. at 861. The Court further emphasized that any overlapping and illustrative terms that
might have been used were intended to enlarge and not to confine the Agency's power to regulate
particular sources to effectuate the policies of the Act. Id. at 862.
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agencies' special expertise, and noted that the EPA has consistently
intepreted the term "source" flexibly in the context of a technical and
complex arena, rather than in a sterile vacuum. 78  The fact that the
interpretation of the term changes over time does not mean that deference is
not warranted. 79 Therefore, the Court in Chevron expressly recognized the
pivotal role of agencies in shaping and changing statutory interpretation in
order to better meet societal needs,a task which agencies are better suited
than the courts to accomplish, given their expertise and technical knowledge.
The Supreme Court in Chevron not only justified such strong deference
because of pragmatic reasons such as efficiency and expertise, but also
envisioned that it was mandated and rooted in the separation of powers
existing between the executive and the judicial branch.80
The Court reasoned that as agencies are part of the political branch and
are accountable to the people, although indirectly, it is therefore more
appropriate for them to resolve ambiguities or gaps left by the legislative
bodies than it is for the judicial branch to do so.8 From this perspective the
Court's decision in Chevron is strongly supported by the Constitution.
The Chevron case clearly created a strong deference in favor of agency
decisions and a presumption in favor of agency determinations. 82 Even if its
impact has been overstated, after Chevron, the affirmance rate increased by
almost 15% and remands and reversals declined 40%.83 As such, "the
Supreme Court's decisions regarding standards of review for agency action
have had very real consequences for appeals of agency decisions. 84
C. The Christensen Decision
In the years following the Court's decision in Chevron, in several
instances, courts have refused to accord Chevron strong deference to agency
interpretations that were made "in the context of informal agency decisions
78. Id. at 863.
79. Id. It is therefore evident the importance of deference in allowing a statutory interpretation
that is consonant with changing societal needs.
80. See id. at 865.
81. Id.
82. See id. In Mead Corp., Justice Scalia particularly stresses this feature of the Chevron
decision, stating that "Chevron made no mention of any need to find such an affirmative intent;
instead it said that in the event of statutory ambiguity, agency authority to clarify was to be
presumed." Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 252. In Justice Scalia's opinion, Chevron rendered Skidmore
anachronistic and when courts owe any deference, it has to be Chevron deference. See id. at 237.
83. See Rossi, supra note 2, at 1115.
84. Id. at 1115.
or statements, such as appellate briefs, manuals, and opinion letters. 8 5 Such
decisions were issued in the name and spirit of Skidmore and raised
questions as to the appropriate scope of application of Chevron deference.86
However, it was not until Christensen v. Harris County 87 that the Court
addressed the scope of application of Chevron strong deference.88
The Court's pronunciation in Christensen clarified the application of the
deference doctrine first articulated in Skidmore.89 It represents a clear retreat
from the application of the Chevron deference. 90
In Christensen, the dispute arose out of the interpretation of the
provisions of the Federal Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA) authorizing states
and their political subdivisions to compensate their employees for overtime
work by granting them permission to take time off from work at full pay.
91
As the absences due to compensatory time off became an increasing cost,
Harris County implemented a policy in the form of an informal letter, setting
a limit to the compensatory time accruable and thus allowing the supervisors
to order employees to take voluntary compensatory time even against the
employees' will. 92 Some of the employees of the County's Sheriff Office
challenged this policy.
93
Although under Chevron the policy issued by Harris County should
have been upheld as long as embodying a permissible construction of the
statute, the Court held that the County's policy statement was subject to the
weaker Skidmore deference and therefore should be upheld only if
persuasive.94 First, the Court reasoned that such lower deference was
85. Id. at 118 (comparing Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44-45 (1993)(finding no
Chevron deference for Sentencing Commission Guideline commentary), and EEOC v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256-58 (1991) (finding EEOC guidelines not entitled to Chevron deference
but only to Skidmore deference), with Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 62 (1995) (according Chevron
deference to Program Statement by the Bureau of Prisons)).
86. Id.
87. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
88. Rossi, supra note 2, at 1118. Professor Robert Anthony is one of the strongest proponents of
the view that "Chevron deference should not apply to agency interpretations" adopted pursuant to
informal decision-making procedure because "[w]here the format is an informal one, it ordinarily
does not carry the force of law." Robert Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind
Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1,4 (1990). If the court determines that Congress did
not intend an interpretation to carry the force of law, then the court should accord Skidmore
deference. See id. at 41.
89. See Rossi, supra note 2, at 1105.
90. Id. at 1120.
91. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 578 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207 (1938)).
92. See id. at 578-81. The policy was issued by Harris County after having requested the advice
of the Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division. Id. at 580. The agency issued an opinion
letter that was disregarded by Harris County because it provided that the position of agency was that,
absent a prior agreement on the point, neither the statute nor the regulations would permit an
employer to force an employee to use accrued compensatory time. See id.
93. Id. at 578.
94. Id. at 586-87.
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mandated by the fact that informal letters do not carry the force of law as do
other more formal modes of agency decisions, such as formal adjudication
or notice and comment rulemaking, as "Congress did not intend the informal
mode of statement that the agency had chosen to be binding on courts." 95
Therefore, in determining whether Chevron deference applies, the proper
inquiry is not only whether there was a gap or ambiguity in the statutory
scheme but also whether Congress intended in that specific case for the
agency interpretation to carry the force of law.
96
Secondly, focusing on the procedure followed by agencies in arriving at
their interpretations, the Court reasoned that in the specific case Chevron
deference was not warranted because the policy statement was not issued
following a type of deliberation that afforded public participation and that
allowed the creation of an explanatory record for the agency decision.97 The
Court distinguished between the informal procedure utilized in the present
case and formal adjudication or notice and comment rulemaking, which
instead, pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act,
enhance public participation and create an explanatory record of the
decision, thus justifying Chevron deference. 98
In Christensen, all justices, except Justice Scalia, agreed that the
County's interpretation was subject to Skidmore deference.99 Justice Scalia
argued that Chevron applied, but notwithstanding such strong deference the
policy could not stand because it was based on an unreasonable
interpretation of the relevant statute.'00 The other justices, although agreeing
on the application of the Skidmore test, had differing views as to its
application. Under the approach to the Skidmore test employed by the
majority in the decision, a court must first interpret a statute, then comparing
such interpretation to the one given by the agency, the court then determines
if it is persuaded that the agency's interpretation is better, and if it is not so
95. Id. at 587 (citing Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,
Inc., 499 U.S. 244, 256-58 (1991) (stating that interpretive guidelines do not deserve Chevron
deference); Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991) (holding that interpretive and enforcement
guidelines are not entitled to Chevron deference)).
96. Id.
97. See id. at 587.
98. Id. See also Rossi, supra note 2, at 1123 n.86 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994) (providing
that interested persons have the right to participate in rulemaking through submission of written data,
views or arguments, and requiring a general statement of basis and purpose for rules)); 5 U.S.C. §
554 (1994) (providing interested persons with the opportunity to submit and have considered facts
and arguments in adjudicative hearings prior to final agency decision).
99. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587-89; 596-96.
100. Id. at 591-92.
persuaded, then no deference is due under Skidmore.' ' Justice Stevens
instead proposed an approach relying more heavily on the factors that were
enumerated in the Skidmore decision itself, and held that in light of the
agency's thoroughness of consideration and of its position in reaching the
decision, respect was warranted. 02 Justice Breyer instead viewed Skidmore
as a test integrated with the Chevron test in which Skidmore deference is a
type of Chevron step two reasonableness inquiry.'03
The Court's decision in Christensen clarified that Skidmore and not
Chevron deference applies in cases of informal decisions not carrying force
of law. However, although a first important step towards the definition of
the boundaries between Skidmore and Chevron, the Christensen decision did
not clearly define their relative fields of operation. Furthermore, in light of
the varying approaches proposed by the differing opinions presented in the
case, it did not provide a clear test for the application of the Skidmore
deference.
III. UNITED STATES V. MEAD CORP.
Although ex post facto review of agency interpretations has contributed
to "slowing agency rulemaking processes and making it costlier," such
judicial review serves important functions. 0 4  First, it represents a
considerable counter-balance to the agency power with regard to regulatory
schemes that involve and affect a large segment of the population and may
cost taxpayer money.'05 Second, judicial review of agency decisions "may
serve a legitimating function in our democratic system" and help diminish
the abuses of the regulatory system created by Congress in statutory
schemes.10 6  Therefore, in the context of the discussion regarding the
permissible and appropriate extent of unchecked or extended agency
discretion, "one should evaluate the extent to which various aspects of ex-
post review help check abuses and the extent to which these aspects impose
superfluous costs on the regulatory system."' 10 7
101. Seeid.at587.
102. Id. at 595-96.
103. See id. at 596-97. Justice Breyer's dissent stated that "the Labor Department's position in
this matter is eminently reasonable, hence persuasive, whether one views that decision through
Chevron's lens, through Skidmore's lens, or through both." Id. at 597 (Breyer, J., dissent).
104. Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 458.
105. Id. at 458-59.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 459.
740
[Vol. 30: 725, 2003] United States v. Mead Corp
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
A. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Mead Corp., delivered
by Justice Souter, addressed the question of what degree judicial deference
should be given to an informal tariff classification ruling letter issued by the
United States Customs Services (Customs) pursuant to the harmonized tariff
schedule of the United States (HTSUS).'0°
Pursuant to the HTSUS, goods imported into the United States are taxed
according to the different categories to which they belong, and their final
classification and rate for taxation purposes is determined by Customs. °9
Such classification is performed by the Customs through the issuance of
binding ruling letters prior to the entry of the imported goods. 0 If a change
of practice or other modification is not present, such letters constitute
authority in the disposition of identical future transactions, however, they are
subject to modification or revocation "'without notice to any person, except
the person to who [sic] the letter was addressed, '''.... and before being issued
they are not subject to notice and comment because they respond to
"transactions of the moment.""' 2
Defendant, Mead Corp., imported day planners that for many years were
classified by the Customs as items free of duty." 3 However, in 1993 the
Customs headquarters issued a ruling letter classifying Mead Corp.'s day
planners in the subcategory of "'[d]iaries, notebooks and address books,
bound. . ."' subject instead to a 4% import duty.' "4 The Customs' ruling
reasoned that "diary" comprehended also a "book including 'printed dates
108. MeadCorp., 533 U.S. at 218.
109. See Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, 19 U.S.C. § 1500 (1930) (providing
that Customs "shall, under rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary [of the treasury] ... fix
the final classification and rate of duty applicable to such ... merchandise").
110. See 19 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (1930) (providing that "[t]he Secretary of the Treasury shall
establish and promulgate such rules and regulations not inconsistent with the law (including
regulations establishing procedures for the issuance of binding rulings prior to the entry of the
merchandise concerned)). These rulings are performed by the Customs through the issuance of
ruling letters, as authorized by the Secretary of Treasury. 19 C.F.R. § 177.8 (2000).
111. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 223 (quoting 19 C.F.F. § 117.9 (c) (2000).
112. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1625(a) (1930)). Most ruling letters contain little or no reasoning, but
simply describe goods and state the appropriate category and tariff, while few letters in fact set forth
a rationale for the determination. Id. at 224. The ruling letters may be issued by any of the offices
of the Customs at the port of entry of the merchandise or by the Customs Headquarters Office. id.
113. ld.at225.
114. Id. at 224 (citing 185 F.3d 1304,1305 (C.A.Fed. 1999) (citing subheading 4820.10.20)). The
letter moved such day planners from one subcategory to another individuated by HTSUS 4820.10,
thus causing an import tax to be imposed on the day planners. Id. at 225.
for daily memoranda and jottings; and "bound" included also "a
reinforcement or fittings of metal, plastics, etc ....
After the Customs rejected Mead Corp.'s protest, Mead Corp. filed suit
in the Court of International Trade (CIT) and subsequently in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit."'
The Court of Appeals held that such ruling letters deserve neither
Chevron deference, nor any other deference, because they were not issued
pursuant to notice and comment power and therefore do not carry force of
law." 7 Therefore, after rejecting Customs' reasoning on the classification,
the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the CIT."8
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the
limits of the Chevron deference owed to administrative practice in applying
a statutory scheme." 9 The majority of the Court held that the Customs
ruling at issue fails to qualify for Chevron deference but remanded the case
because of the possibility that it deserves some deference under the
Skidmore decision. 1
20
As to the specific legal standard applicable in the deference
determination, the majority of the Court held that administrative
implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron
deference only when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law and that the agency
interpretation was promulgated in pursuance of that authority. 2 ' According
to the Court, such delegation may be shown when Congress either provided
an agency with the power to engage in formal adjudication or in notice and
comment rulemaking. 2 2  Furthermore, and very notably, it provides that
115. Id. Such reasoning was not provided in the first ruling letter, but a second ruling letter
specifically referred to the Oxford English Dictionary definition of "diary" in reaching the
interpretation therein. Id.
116. Id. The Court of International Trade granted a summary judgment in favor of the Customs
Service adopting the Customs' reasoning but not providing any holding about the deference
warranted to the ruling letters. See id.
117. Id. at 226.
118. Id. The Court of Appeals rejected Customs' reasoning, holding that Mead Corp.'s day
planners were not "diaries" because there was not extensive space for notation, and furthermore,
they were not "bound" because otherwise the category of "unbound diaries" would be left unfilled.
Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 227. As to the question whether a ruling letter is subject to Skidmore deference, in
Federal Election Commission, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia held that agency
interpretations such as those in opinion letters, policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines, all of which lack the force of law, do not warrant Chevron-style deference; instead,
interpretations contained in formats such as opinion letters are entitled to respect under the Supreme
Court's Skidmore decision. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. National Rifle Ass'n of America, 254 F.3d
173, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
121. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226-27.
122. Id. at 227.
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such delegation of power can take place also "by some other indication of a
comparable congressional intent.' ' 23 Therefore, it is patent that the inquiry
as to the appropriate deference warranted to an agency's decision will be
both fact intensive and connected to the specific statutory scheme that the
agency is administering and the general duties of an agency. The rule, as
shaped, is very flexible as to what causes the Chevron deference to apply or
not to apply and requires a case specific insight and analysis of the
Congressional intent. The Court says that whether or not the Congress has
delegated authority to elucidate a specific provision, agencies make all sorts
of interpretive choices, and the fair measure of deference to an agency
administering its own statute has been understood to vary with the
circumstances. 1
24
The majority of the Court expressly recognizes and reasserts the
principle originally set forth in Chevron, that in case of express delegation
by the Congress of the power to fill a gap in the statutory scheme by
regulation, "any ensuing regulation is binding in the courts unless
procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.' 25 However, analogous to its decision in Chevron,
the Court also considers the specialized technical expertise and the "well-
reasoned views" of agencies implementing a statute and held that
notwithstanding the absence of an express delegation, such views "constitute
a body of experience and informed judgment" which can provide courts with
proper guidance and "may influence courts facing questions the agencies
have already answered."'126 Furthermore, the Court expressly recognizes that
considerable weight is to be accorded "to an executive department's
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer."'
127
The majority opinion exposes that courts throughout the years have
considered different factors in determining, under the circumstances, the fair
amount of deference to be given to an agency decision, and a considerable
fragmentation in the field of judicial deference to agency decisions
developed as a result. 28 The courts have inquired into the degree of care
exercised by the agency, its consistency of decisions, its relative expertise in
a particular field, and the level of persuasiveness of its position. 29 In this
123. Id.
124. Id. at 227-28.
125. Id. at 227 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 822).
126. Id. (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998)).
127. Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
128. See id at 228.
129. Id. (citing General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976) (considering the
context of fragmentation, the Court found that its decision in Skidmore
represents an effective synthesis of these factors, which is capable of
providing a test granting the necessary flexibility appropriate in the field.
Accordingly, the deference which should be accorded to an agency decision
in a specific case "will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade,
if lacking power to control."'
' 30
Furthermore, the majority of the Court recognizes that an enhanced level
of deference is not only appropriate in case of express delegation but also
when it is "apparent from the agency's generally conferred authority and
other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be
able to speak with the force of law .... In the case of such implied
delegation, analogous to the case of express delegation, the court held that
the agency decision cannot be rejected simply because it is unwise, but
instead the Court "is obliged to accept the agency's position if Congress has
not previously spoken to the point at issue and the agency's interpretation is
reasonable."'
32
The Court indicates that Chevron strong deference is appropriate, and
delegation of force of law power is present both when Congress has given an
agency the prerogative to engage in rule making or adjudication producing
"rulings for which deference is claimed."13 This represents the so-called
notice and comment power. In addition, delegation of power to issue
decisions having the force of law is present when Congress has provided for
agency decisions, a relatively formal administrative procedure "tending to
foster the fairness and deliberation. .. ,,'34 However, the Court importantly
determines that the fact that the ruling given in the case at hand was not
pursuant to notice and comment authority does not per se exclude
application of Chevron deference because the Court has "sometimes found
reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality
was required and none was afforded."'35
thoroughness evident in the agency's consideration); Good Samaritan Hosp.v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402,
417 (1993) (considering the consistency of an agency's position as a factor in assessing the weight to
the accorded); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995) (holding that internal agency guideline is
entitled only to some deference); Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist.,
467 U.S. 380, 390 (1984) (considering the relative expertness of the agency)).
130. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
131. MeadCorp., 533 U.S. at 229.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 230.
135. Id. at 23 1. This statement is important because this can be used in the future to guarantee
Chevron deference even to cases where political or contingent reasons require it. This provision,
which can be defined an "escape clause," seriously impacts the forseeability of the standard of
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Even if the above considered "escape clause," under some
circumstances, can justify Chevron deference in absence of notice and
comment power of formal adjudication power, the majority of the Court held
that in the present case such circumstances were not present, and therefore
Chevron deference was improper.16 The Court reasoned that the amount of
such rulings itself refuted any possibility of providing each one of such
letters with the force of law. 137 In particular, "to claim that classifications
have legal force is to ignore ... that 46 different Customs offices issue
10,000 to 15,000 of them [classification ruling letters] each year."'3 As in
the present case, the ruling letter was issued by the Customs' headquarters
and not by one of the 46 satellite offices; an argument was made that a
higher level of deference was appropriate.139 However, the Court considered
this factor as not determinative because there was no evidence that the
statutory scheme recognized letters issued by the headquarters as different
from the others, not even when, as in the present case, the letters were also
accompanied by a developed reasoning. 140 Therefore, the Court held that the
Customs' classification ruling at issue does not deserve Chevron strong
deference but is instead best treated like "interpretations contained in policy
statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines."'
' 4
'
However, the determination that Chevron deference is not applicable to
the Customs' ruling did not lead the Supreme Court to agree with the Court
review. See id.
136. Id. at 231. The Court reasoned that "[tihe authorization for classification rulings, and
Customs' practice in making them, present a case far removed not only from notice and comment
process but also from any other circumstances reasonably suggesting that Congress ever thought of
classification rulings as deserving [Chevron] deference." Id. 231. In particular: a) there is no
indication that the terms in the statute meant to delegate authority to make classification rulings with
force of law (the Court, however, notes that it is not making a general statement on the general
authority of Customs); b) even if 19 U.S.C. § 1502(a) authorizes rulings prior to the entry of
merchandise, the rulings bind only the parties to the ruling; c) even if 19 U.S.C. § 1502(a) seems to
assume that such rulings may be precedents, the precedential value alone does not add up to Chevron
entitlement (this is important because the Court is stating that, without notice and comment or formal
adjudication the mere fact that a decision is precedent does not determine by itself that Chevron
deference is appropriate); d) any precedential claim of a classification ruling is then balanced by the
independent review of the CIT; and e) a letter's binding character as a ruling stops short of third
parties. See id. at 231-32.
137. Id. at 233.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 225.
140. Id. at 233-34. Neither the statutory changes show such congressional intent because notice
and comment procedures are required only when modifying or revoking a prior classification and
under its regulations the Customs are obliged to produce notice and comment only when changing a
practice so as to produce a tariff increase. Id.
141. Id. (citing Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587).
of Appeals that no deference at all to such rulings was the appropriate
outcome. In fact, "Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmore's" holding
that an agency's interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form,
given the 'specialized experience and access to broader investigations and
information"' that it had. 142 It is evident therefore that the consideration of
the agencies' specialized knowledge and expertise, which was explicitly the
basis for the decision in Chevron, plays an important role generally in the
field of judicial deference to the agencies' decision and represents a
significant factor. The Court considers that in the specific case, in light of
the details of the statutory scheme and the specialized experience of the
Customs, the classification ruling can at least seek a deference which is
proportional to the 'persuasiveness of the decision, and therefore a claim of
deference under Skidmore can be raised.1
43
The Court further elucidates that its decision in Mead Corp. is grounded
in the choice to provide a multifarious and various spectrum of possible
levels of judicial deference in order to tailor such levels to the variety
present in the statutory schemes authorizing agency action. 44  Although
different from the solution proposed by Justice Scalia, the majority of the
Court specifically recognizes that the conclusion it reaches originates from
the common need to deal with "the great variety of ways in which the laws
invest the Government's administrative arms with discretion ....
The Court indicates that Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmore but
simply recognized that in case of explicit or implied delegation, a higher
level of deference was appropriate. 46 In support of this point, the majority
specifically recalls its recent decision in Christensen, reaffirming that
Skidmore deference was not swept away by Chevron. 47 The Court says that
142. Id. (citation omitted). There is room for a Skidmore claim when, like here, the regulatory
scheme is highly detailed and therefore a classification ruling in this situation may at least seek a
respect proportional to the power to persuade. See id. Under Skidmore, look at "thoroughness, logic
and expertness, its fit with prior interpretations, and any other sources of weight." ld. at 235.
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. Id. at 236-37.
146. Id. at 234-35.
147. Id. at 235. The significance of the Skidmore decision beyond Chevron and Mead was
recently stated by the court in Glover v. Standard Federal Bank, 238 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2002). In
Glover, Plaintiffs challenged the term of a loan provided by Defendant as violative of the Real Estate
Settlement Procedure Act (RESPA) and Defendant argued that the disputed fees were allowed by
policy statements issued by the Department of Housing and Urban development ("HUD"). Id. at
956-57. The court held that the HUD policy statements were not entitled to Chevron deference
under Mead because they constituted agency interpretation of its own regulations and not of a
statutory scheme. Id. at 962. However, the court reasoned that the agency's determination was to be
accorded some deference, even if not Chevron deference, holding therefore that the agency decision
was entitled to Skidmore deference. ld. Accordingly, the court upheld such HUD determinations
because they were "reasoned" and derived from the HUD expertise in the field. Id. at 962-63. It is
evident, therefore, that Skidmore deference was viewed by the court as having significance separate
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its choice favors variety and the continued recognition of Skidmore is
necessary for the reasons that Justice Jackson gave when Skidmore was
decided.148  Accordingly the Court remanded the case for proceedings
consistent with the opinion. 149
B. Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia strongly challenges the majority opinion in Mead Corp.,
basing his attack on objections not simply directed at the standard of review
set out in Skidmore, but also to collateral, yet significant, observations
regarding the effect that the insertion of such a standard creates on the
burden of proof. In fact, Justice Scalia first notes that the "avulsive change
in judicial review" of administrative action introduced by the decision in
Mead Corp. regards precisely the presumption applicable in the field. 50
While before there was a general presumption of authority of agencies to
interpret the statute they administer, it has been changed to a presumption of
no such authority.'' Justice Scalia points out that such a presumption will
be overcome only by affirmative legislative pronunciation showing a
contrary intent.1
5 2
Secondly, Justice Scalia asserts that as a corollary, the Court's decision
in Mead Corp. will increase the normative complexity in tlhe field. In fact,
when agency authority to resolve ambiguity did not exist, no deference was
accorded to the agency by the courts, while now courts are directed to give
an indeterminate amount of deference under Skidmore.
53
from Mead and applicable to the vast body of law represented by agencies' interpretation of their
own regulations.
148. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 238 n.19. According to the majority of the Court, it cannot treat
thousands of classification rulings by Customs as substantive law. Id. To avoid this problem, Justice
Scalia proposes that Chevron deference should be accorded only to those official pronouncements
that are approved at the highest hierarchical levels in the agency. Id. Justice Scalia finds Chevron
deference due because, in the case at issue, the Secretary approved the government's position in its
brief to the Court. Id. However, the Court dismisses such an argument because the deference was
not formed until after the beginning of the litigation and would be deference to the brief rather than
to the classification ruling and, as such, the contention of Justice Scalia was not accepted. Id..
149. Id. at 239.
150. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. Id.
152. Id. Justice Scalia discusses how that the presumption had been that the agency had authority
according to Chevron whenever there was an ambiguity in the statute, while now this presumption
doctrine had been collapsed, thus announcing that a presumption of agency discretion does not exist
unless the statute, expressly or impliedly, provides otherwise. Id.
153. Id. Justice Scalia says that the Court has thus replaced Chevron in a large number of cases
(where there is no express rule making authority or adjudication power) with the beloved test of
Justice Scalia's considerations are certainly meritorious, and by focusing
his analysis on the shifting of the burden of proof, he implicitly conveys that
he considers such shifting the strongest impact of the Court's decision. This
is proved by his assertion that as a consequence of the decision, the Mead
doctrine "has today replaced the Chevron doctrine, for years to come.,"
15 4
While technically the Court's decision in Mead Corp. only redefines the
scope of application of Chevron, or at most partially replaces its application,
such statement by Justice Scalia seems to be dictated by his conviction that
the shift in the burden of proof will considerably limit the application of
Chevron. In Justice Scalia's opinion, this new doctrine is not sound in
principle. Chevron was important to the division of powers between the
second and third branches because, when there was ambiguity in a statute, it
gave Chevron deference to an agency's interpretation, independent of
whether there was notice and comment rule power or adjudicative power
expressly or impliedly given to the agency.' 55 Justice Scalia exposes that the
present decision is directly contrary to recent affirmations of the Court,
which, instead of presuming that discretion did not exist unless explicitly or
implicitly provided, clearly provided that "the ambiguity will be resolved
first and foremost by the agency ....""'
After challenging the Court's opinion as to the burden of proof and level
of simplicity of application, Justice Scalia directly attacks the application of
the Skidmore test. Justice Scalia notes that the Court's decision, providing
that Chevron deference is appropriate only in cases when an agency's power
of formal adjudication or notice and comment rulemaking "resurrects, in full
force, the pre-Chevron doctrine of Skidmore deference... .1"7  Skidmore
deference is beloved by most courts because it constitutes, as characterized
by Justice Scalia himself, the old "totality of the circumstances" test.'58
In Fontana v. Caldera,' 59 the court recently considered the test set-forth
in Mead Corp. itself to determine whether Chevron or Skidmore applies as a
Skidmore that is more like the old totality of the circumstances test. Id. at 241.
154. Id. at 258-59.
155. Id. at 241-42. The power of the agency was presumed because it was presumed that
Congress intended to give the agency discretion in resolving the ambiguity. Id. Justice Scalia
basically contends that the new rule provides that ambiguities in legislative instructions to agencies
are to be resolved not by the agencies but by the judges. Such rule could only be departed from if
congressional intent is shown to give rule making or adjudicatory power to the agencies. Id.
However, even if the new framework set forth in Mead Corp. provides the courts with broader
powers of review, it is not technically correct that, in absence of formal adjudication or notice and
comment rulemaking, ambiguities will be resolved by the courts. Such ambiguities will still be
resolved by the agencies, but subject to a less deferential standard of review in the situation where a
controversy is brought before the courts, which are impartial parties in the litigation.
156. Id. at 257 (citing Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996)).
157. Id.at241.
158. See id.
159. 160 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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totality of the circumstances test, thus echoing Scalia's complexity
concerns. 6 In fact, if both these definitions are accepted, resulting in a
totality of the circumstances test, and if the answer is negative, the court will
be involved in a further totality of the circumstances determination, the
Skidmore test itself. Justice Scalia exposes that this new legislative
framework created by the Court in Mead Corp. "is neither sound in
principle, nor sustainable in practice."'' 6 In his opinion, it is not valid in
principle because the new rule created by the Court in Mead Corp. presumes
that ambiguities are to be resolved by the judges and not agencies, therefore
totally reversing the prior rule presuming intent in favor of agency
interpretation. 162  Only in the case of notice and comment rulemaking, or
formal adjudication, is Chevron deference appropriate, and on this point
Justice Scalia strongly criticizes the Court's opinion. He argues that the
court's rule is implausible, as "there is no necessary connection between the
formality of procedure and the power of the entity administering the
procedure to resolve authoritatively questions of law."'
63
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia further argues that "protracted
confusion" will derive from the present decision because of the uncertainty
of the standard of judicial deference appropriate for the decisions which are
160. See id. at 128. It is therefore evident that Justice Scalia's concerns for normative complexity
and lack of predictability are seriously grounded.
161. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 241. As to principle, Scalia notes that the Chevron doctrine had its
roots in the presumption that there was Congressional intent that all administrative agency
interpretations deserve deference. Id. Such presumption is important to the division of powers
between the executive and the judiciary and "was in accord with the origins of federal- court-judicial
review," which was exercised principally through the writ of mandamus. Id. at 241-42.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 243. In Justice Scalia's opinion, such contradiction is proven by the fact that, in case of
formal adjudication of the agency decision, the procedure is modeled after a trial. Id. However,
courts are not given deference to resolve questions of law, and therefore it is not totally rational to
accord deference to the agency's resolution of questions of law. Id. However, although this point in
Scalia's dissenting opinion seems to be both powerful and convincing, it should be recognized that
the analogy made between a court and an agency action on this issue in not completely correct. In
fact, reasons of efficiency and economy are present in the agency context, which thus justify a higher
degree of deference. Furthermore, court decisions as to issues of law could potentially have a much
higher impact from the legal point of view, which justifies the necessity of de novo review of
resolution of law issues on appeal. Justice Scalia emphasizes that in some cases, the agencies are
also given the option of using informal rule making or a case by case administration. Id. Under the
Court's approach, this would change the deference given, so that both Chevron and Skidmore would
depend on how the agency chooses to exercise authority. Surely, that cannot have been Congress'
intent in creating statutes giving such a choice. Id. However, even Justice Scalia's last argument
can be overcome, because as the Congress can decide to mandate a formal or informal procedure, it
can also leave to the agency's discretional choice the decision as to the most appropriate procedure
to be employed.
749
neither notice and comment rulemaking nor formal adjudication, and which
are made personally by Cabinet Secretaries and other high level officers.
164
Justice Scalia finds it absurd that the decisions made so high in the hierarchy
are to be accorded no deference.
61
In addition, Justice Scalia contends that "protracted confusion" will
originate not only because the Skidmore test is very imprecise but also due to
the open ended exception in the "escape clause", which in practice requires a
fact intensive determination in each case, further artificially increasing the
use of notice and comment rulemaking decisions. 66 Moreover, the present
164. Id. at 245.
165. See id at 244 (citing United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 508 (1974) (involving
application of 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1968)) (requiring wiretap applications to be authorized by the
United States Attorney General or any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the
Attorney General); see also D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns. v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1248-1249 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (involving application of 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1966) (requiring the Secretary of
Transportation to determine that there is "no feasible and prudent alternative" to the use of publicly
owned parkland for a federally funded highway.)). Although Justice Scalia in this part of the
opinion raises an important weakness in the framework created by the Court in Mead Corp.
(discussed infra, part IV), at the same time, he mischaracterizes the majority opinion on this point.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 244-45. For even if Chevron did not apply to such decisions, the
determination would not then be left without any deference, but rather, Skidmore deference remains,
which is still deference, even if not as strong as the one accorded by the Court in the Chevron
decision. Furthermore Justice Scalia should have recognized that the Court's opinion addresses
these concerns in the "escape clause," which necessarily creates a flexible rule. As discussed in the
impact section, considering the increasing demand for national security following the September II
terrorist attacks, this will be the area of application of the Court's decision which will most test the
real strength of the Mead Corp. decision. In fact, the broad reach of Mead Corp. will be seriously
impaired if considerations of national security and effectiveness of law enforcement activities in
general were to prevail on transparency and the increased individual rights protection fostered by a
heightened level ofjudicial scrutiny.
166. Id. at 245-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting). First, such imprecision derives from the fact that the
Court recognizes that other procedures, different from notice and comment rulemaking or formal
adjudication, in precise cases can denote a congressional intent to provide force of law to agency
interpretations. Id. Second, Justice Scalia is concerned with what can be defined the "escape
clause" in Mead Corp.: the provision whereby the Court states that "the absence of notice and
comment rulemaking... is not enough to decide the question of Chevron deference 'for we have
sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality was
required and none was afforded."' Id at 245. Justice Scalia's concerns are surely appropriate, and
as discussed infra Part V, the real success and power of the present decision will be mostly measured
by looking at the capacity of the Court to use the "escape clause" as an exceptional tool to afford
Chevron deference and not as an ordinary instrument to distort the meaning of the present decision.
Notice and comment rulemaking will be artificially increased because it warrants the agency
Chevron deference and is not subject to the limitations of formal adjudication that must be mandated
by statute or constitutional provision. Id. With regard to this issue, courts will face complications
because in the national security field, different agencies will likely share responsibility in the
enforcement of statutory schemes. In fact, "if more than one agency can interpret a given statutory
term ... discerning presumed congressional intent necessarily becomes a more complex endeavor."
Daniel Lovejoy, Note, The Ambiguous Basis For Chevron Deference. Multiple-Agency Statutes, 88
VA. L. RiV. 879, 880 (2002) (referring as an example to the definition of "disability" in the
Americans with Disabilities Act as a term that each agency needs to define and have such definition
accorded deference in order not to frustrate the purpose of the Chevron defense).
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decision will have an adverse effect because of the longstanding rule that
courts must defer to the agency's interpretations of its own regulations,
thereby encouraging agencies to create "ambiguous rules construing
statutory ambiguities, which [the agency] can in turn further clarify through
informal rulings entitled to judicial respect. 67
Furthermore, Justice Scalia contends that the majority of the Court in its
opinion can assert that the precedents are in accordance with the present
decision only because of the use of a fictional tool, the "escape clause",
which allows the Court to consider the prior decision as showing "the
multifarious ways in which the congressional intent can be manifested.' ' 68
167. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 246 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Justice Scalia's opinion, it will only
lead to the agencies rushing to produce ambiguous rules construing ambiguoui statutes, and relying
on the old principle (left untouched by Mead Corp.) that judges must defer to reasonable agency
interpretations of their own regulations. Id. at 246. With regard to this problematic situation, the
court in Glover, as discussed previously, seemed provide an answer to Justice Scalia's concern by
subjecting the agency's interpretations of its own regulations to Skidmore deference, thereby limiting
the adverse effects envisioned in the dissenting opinion in Mead Corp. See Glover v. Standard Fed.
Bank, 283 F.3d 953, 962-63 (8th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, Justice Scalia contends that the new rule
will lead to the ossification of large portions of our statutory laws. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at
247. This is because, under Chevron, the agency could change interpretations. However, for post-
Chevron decisions, after the first judicial pronouncement, ambiguity and flexibility will cease, and it
will become unlawful for the agency to take a different position. Id. According to Justice Scalia,
this could cause an unprecedented abdication of judicial power because it is possible to envision the
situation where one agency interpretation rendered without the formalities that deserve Chevron
deference is not agreed on by the court, but is then rendered by the same agency with those
formalities so to get Chevron deference and avoid the power of the court. See id. at 250. Justice
Scalia criticizes the sliding scale of Skidmore as a truism and a trifling statement of the obvious. He
says that Skidmore deference was fine in older world but not in modem world with a lot profusion of
federal agencies and in this setting it can only bring to unpredictability, uncertainty and endless
litigation. Id. The idea that the inquiry adopted by the Court in Mead will not solve interpretive
problems is shared by those considering the "search of congressional intent chimerical." David J.
Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron s NonDelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 203 (2001).
This would be the result of the fact that Congress rarely discloses its view behind a statutory scheme.
Id. The proposed alternative is denominated by its proponents as the high level/low level distinction,
in which higher deference should be accorded to decisions according to the "position in the agency
hierarchy of the person assuming responsibility for the administrative decision." Id. at 204-05. The
major problem such an approach poses approach is in making the determination of the real source of
intent behind a decision, as opposed to the formal source - the mere formal origin of the
determination. However, Mead and Skidmore incorporate an inquiry into the persuasiveness and
expertise of an agency, which in turn relates also to the hierarchy of those issuing it in the agency.
This is also recognized by those proposing the high level/low level distinction, which recognizes that
their approach "even if in a sense unrecognized [is] ... present in all of their different views on the
issue." Id. at 205.
168. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 257. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia contends that the new
rule announced by the majority in Mead Corp. is rendered meaningless when it says that "as
significant as notice and comment is in pointing to Chevron authority, the want of that procedure
here does not decide the case for we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference when no
such administrative formality was required and none was afforded." Id. at 245. With this
Significantly, after stressing the point at the beginning, Justice Scalia
further attacks the majority decision because, in contrast with the presumed
intent of Chevron, it shifts the burden of proof requiring the agency to prove
an affirmative Congressional intent that the agency interpretation carries the
force of law.' 69
In addition, Justice Scalia criticizes the Court's reliance on Christensen,
asserting that interpretive opinion letters not issued pursuant to notice and
comment rulemaking or formal adjudication do not carry the force of law
and are not entitled to Chevron deference. 70 In his opinion, such a provision
was only dictum, unsupported by the cases cited in the decision.
Furthermore the majority impermissibly broadened its reach allowing




consideration Justice Scalia individuates in a way a logical "flaw" in the majority decision.
However, such a "flaw", even if seemingly used only as a mean of reconciling the present decisions
with Mead Corp., is a necessary instrument of flexibility in the hands of the judiciary. Justice Scalia
notes that the Court cites as an example of situation in which Chevron deference is afforded in cases
outside of notice and comment rulemaking and formal adjudication: the "deliberative conclusions"
of the Comptroller of Currency as to the meaning of the banking laws. Id. at 251 (citing
Nationsbank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995)). Justice Scalia
contends that if Congress was aware of the "longstanding precedent" regarding such decisions, then
it similarly must have been aware of such precedent with regard to Customs' interpretations in the
present case. Id. at 25 1-52. As to this point, even if Justice Scalia's analogy seems convincing, the
present decision is reconcilable with the fact specific approach according to Chevron authority, and
which under the "escape clause" is required.
169. Id. at 252 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia emphasizes that the precedents have always
presumed such congressional intent, even in a lot of cases in which the agency interpretations were
not released until the formal adjudication or notice and comment rulemaking was. Id. at 252-53
(citing Nationsbank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 252 (1995)
(guaranteeing Chevron deference to a letter of a Senior Deputy Comptroller because he represented
the official position of the agency); FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 438-39 (1986)
(according Chevron deference to interpretation of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation because
such embodied the official position of the agency); Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974
(1986) (according Chevron deference to Secretary of Health and Human Services statutory
interpretation); Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 725-26 (1989) (according Chevron deference to
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's statutory interpretation contained in opinion letters)).
Justice Scalia's further discussion about the shift in the burden of proof reinforces the argument that
he perceived such a shift as the major change in the applicable law that would have the highest
potential of impacting agency's power. Id. at 251-52 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170. /d.at251.
171. Id. at 240. According to Justice Scalia, it was dictum because in Christensen, the Court
found that the Secretary of Labor's interpretation "made little sense," and therefore it could not even
have been sustained using Chev'on deference. Id. at 254. The cases cited in Christensen, according
to Justice Scalia, did not support the holding in such case. See id. at 255 (citing Reno v. Koray, 515
U.S. 50 (1995) (cited for the contention that this case is not supportive because it did not consider
the level of deference accorded to the Bureau of Prison's statutory interpretation set forth in agency
guidelines because the Court would have arrived on its own at the same result); EEOC v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991) (cited due to Justice Scalia's assertion that this case is not
supportive because the decision accorded Skidmnore, deference but only because it was based on a
pre-Chevron decision); Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144
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In resolving the present controversy, Justice Scalia expresses that
adherence to the original formulation of the Chevron doctrine would have
been more appropriate, thereby presuming that "absent some clear textual
indication to the contrary," the resolution of ambiguities by the
administrative agency "must be accepted by the courts if it is reasonable.1
2
Notwithstanding the Court's explanations to the contrary, Justice Scalia
strongly asserts that nothing in the statute that the Customs Service
administers modifies "the background presumption on which deference is
based.",,
73
In open contrast to the Court's opinion, Justice Scalia argues that the
Secretary's rulings on "valuation, rate of duty.., entry requirements..."
should be accorded Chevron deference, and it is not "hard to imagine" a
conforming Congressional intent.
17 4
(1991) (cited as not supportive because the case did not consider the level of deference to be
accorded, but only which of two interpretations deserved deference)). Furthermore, Justice Scalia
criticizes the majority opinion due to his belief that it impermissibly broadens the reach of the
Christensen rule. In fact, through the "escape clause," it envisions cases beyond those considered in
Christensen in which Chevron deference would be appropriate. Id. However, even if Justice
Scalia's consideration is factually accurate, from the juridical point of view is not very relevant.
First, because it is dictum, the Christensen consideration is not binding on the instant case, and
therefore, its extension arguably does not have all of the legal significance as stressed in the
dissenting opinion. Furthermore, the majority decision aims at reaching an appropriate balance in
the scope of application of Chevron deference. Broadening the reach of Skidmore authority as
envisioned in Christensen, the Mead Corp. ruling effectively moves towards the reaching of a
compromise with those who, like Justice Scalia, would instead allow a more liberal use of Chevron
deference.
172. See id at 256-57 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 257 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Contrary to what is asserted by the majority in Mead
Corp., in Justice Scalia's opinion, the statute does not support the Court's ruling. Id. Rather,
according to Justice Scalia, reliance by the Court on two provisions would be misplaced: I) 28
U.S.C. § 2640 (1980), providing that the CIT "shall make its determinations upon the basis of the
record made before the court," would only allow the introduction of new evidence at the CIT stage
but not speak to judicial review; 2) 28 U.S.C. 2638 (1980), cited by the majority, providing that the
CIT "by rule may consider any new ground in support" of a challenge to a ruling, does not have a
connection with the judicial deference to be accorded to the ruling. Instead, in Justice Scalia's
opinion, 28 U.S.C. § 2639 (1980), requiring the CIT "to accord a 'presum[ption of] correct[ness]'
to the Customs Service's interpretation of its statute, is a much more important provision with regard
to the present controversy. Id. at 257-58 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 258, n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although this argument is convincing, it also fails to
recognize that the Court's consideration leaves open the door to a future resolution in favor of
Chevron deference in such a case, if ad hoc considerations justified the application of the "escape
clause." Furthermore, Justice Scalia seems to stretch his argument too far when he asserts that if
Chevron deference were not warranted to the Secretary's personal rulings, no deference would
apply. See id. This is not correct, as in such a case, the Skidmore deference would apply.
Furthermore, even if Skidmore deference is not a level of deference as strong as that afforded by
Chevron, it is deference, and in such a case, a ruling issued by such as high position in the
administration would probably be considered as highly persuasive by the reviewing court.
The Solicitor General filed a brief that was co-signed by the General
Counsel of the Department of Treasury, which reasserted the official
position of the Customs Service that was first asserted in the ruling; that the
letter should be accorded Chevron deference. 175  Reliance on such later
administrative action would be permissible because it is not contended that it
is "merely a 'post hoc rationalization' or an 'agency litigating
position.. .'wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative
practice."'
176
Finally, Justice Scalia argues that even accepting the majority's
formulation of the rule, he would accord Chevron deference to the Customs'
interpretive letter because there is a longstanding tradition "of great
deference to the opinions of the [Customs'] head.' ' 77
For the above reasons, Justice Scalia dissented, and emphasized his
belief that the Court's decision is extremely significant, and will have
enormous and "uniformly bad" consequences. 1
78
175. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 258 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Christensen, 529 U.S. at 591 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment)). Justice Scalia attacks the majority, arguing that he agrees that
10,000 letters a year cannot all be substantive law, but that there would be nothing wrong in giving
more deference if later the Solicitor General files a brief endorsing a decision. See id. at 258 n. 6.
However, even if one considers the absence of post hoc rationalization of administrative action, it is
possible to find a logical coherence in this argument. Allowing such later administrative action to
change the standard of review diminishes the ability of a challenger to the decision to predict the
outcome, and unfairly leaves open the possibility that the Solicitor General or some other high
ranking official could file a brief as a "Damocles' sword" on the challenger's head. Justice Scalia
also argues that the interpretation in the letter was reasonable. See id. This majority evidentially
agreed, because otherwise remand would not be necessary, because if unreasonable it would be
invalid under both Chevron and Skidmore. But remand is necessary for the majority of the Court
(not for Justice Scalia) because the lower court still must judge the persuasiveness of the letter as it is
not entitled to Chevron deference. Id. at 260.
177. Id. (citing NationsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995)). In this
respect, Justice Scalia, analogizes the present case to the decision in Nationsbank as a case where
Chevron deference was warranted notwithstanding the absence of formal adjudication, notice and
comment rulemaking, or comparable administrative formality. See id. See also United States v.
Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 392-93 (1999)(holding that if Customs Service's statutory
interpretation fills gap or defines term in a way that is reasonable in light of legislature's revealed
design, then court will give agency's judgment controlling weight); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United
States, 437 U.S. 443, 457-58 (1978) (holding that longstanding administrative construction of statute
by the Customs Authority was not to be disturbed except for cogent reasons); PATRICK REED, THE
ROLE OF FEDERAL COURTS IN U.S. CUSTOMS & INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 289 (1997) (arguing
that Customs rulings are sustained as long as they are reasonable interpretations of the statute).
178. MeadCorp., 533 U.S. at261.
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IV. IMPACT OF THE DECISION
A. Direct Impact on the Judicial Power of Review
First, the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Mead Corp.
has a direct impact on the power of the courts to review agency
determinations. In fact, it effectively enlarges the scope of operation of the
intermediate standard of judicial review between the well-known de novo
standard of review, and the permissive standard adopted in Chevron. Such a
shift is in direct opposition to the post-modernist idea of the role of the
judiciary. Post modernists agree that role of judiciary should be minimized
and Mead Corp. clearly goes in the opposite direction, leading to Justice
Scalia's strong dissent in both in Mead Corp. and in Christensen. 7 9
Reaching a compromise between the two radically opposed positions of
Chevron and Mead Corp. involves striking a balance between administrative
discretion to ignore substantive limits, and recognizing the need to regulate
the decision-making process, thus avoiding the unchecked flexibility likely
"to undermine the mission of the regulatory program that reformers seek to
further."' 80 Even in limiting the reach of Chevron, the Supreme Court in
Mead Corp. does not undermine the basis for an adequate power of agencies
to interpret statutes in light of their underlying purpose, thereby preserving
the important balance between the court and agency autonomy, which helps
eliminate "the worst impact from statutory micromanagement" and "overly
restrictive [statutory] prescriptions."'' 8 1
179. See Funk, supra note 4, at 174 - 75. In particular post-modernists see the regulation as a
political endeavor that is not suited for courts because more similar to legislation. Id. at 177. On
this point, the rule created by the Court in Mead Corp. is very similar to the balance proposed by
William Funk. Id. In his opinion, courts must accept the political input in the regulatory process but
at the same time use real scrutiny to be sure that the regulation meets the requirements of the law.
Id. The rationale reasoning behind a point such as this is that absent meaningful judicial review the
agencies might give low consideration to the statutory legal requirements and limitations.
180. Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 438. See also PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNIC, LAW AND
SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 64 (1978) (analyzing the impact of the
approach based on the rule of law); Marshall J. Breger, Regulatory Flexibility and the Administrative
State, 32 TULSA L.J. 325, 335 (1996) (regarding the relationship between flexibility and agency
activities).
181. Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 447-48. As already mentioned, there is a need to assure that
courts have sufficient power to guarantee a counterbalance to agencies, thus assuring a correct
administration of statutory schemes. After Chevron, the Court recognized broad discretion;
however, many courts restricted that decision by strict textual readings of the statutes. Id.
Textualism is justified by some commentators on the ground that legislative history is only a fiction,
or that is not a "reliable indicator" of congressional intent. Id. n.65. See also Frank Easterbrook,
A proper compromise between the power of the subjects involved in
administrative regulation and judicial review is pivotal to addressing the
societal concern for too much agency power, guarantee adequate
legitimating functions to judicial review, and promote the diminishment of
abuses. 8 2 In addressing such concerns, the process review as established by
Mead Corp. requires the agency to explain why it reached a certain result
and how the concerns of interest groups were addressed. Focusing process
review on the reasoning of a decision ameliorates improper interest group
influence, undue political influence, and biases from idiosyncratic staff
cultures. 1
83
Furthermore, administrative actions are not always shaped in the public
light, nor are all administrative policies rendered public after being
determined or reassessed. Therefore, an adequate level of judicial scrutiny is
necessary, especially when in response to political pressure, to alter
outcomes, or when an agency modifies "factual presumptions or burdens of
proof."' 8
4
To the extent that Mead Corp. provided a rule of compromise, it
adequately addresses the concern for the overreaching of the executive
power while at the same time allowing adequate agency power when
appropriate. In fact, Congress can always avoid inconsistency or the
potential for uncertainty when necessary by giving the agency the power to
rule with force of law, thus providing the agency Chevron deference, but
thereby involving in the process the legislative branch's assurance of a more
open public debate and transparency in the system. In addition, even in the
Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 68 (1993);
Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 376-77
(1990).
182. See Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 457. In particular, there is a strong threat of improper
political influence for agency adjudications which are resolved outside of the public light. Id. This
concern is particularly relevant at the present time where the increasing demand for national security
and the related necessity for privacy and secrecy of some administrative agencies, like the INS
(Immigration and Naturalization Service) or the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), diminishes
the role of public opinion as a counterbalance to power abuse, and thus requires an increased alert on
the part of the courts to provide a forum to address possible concerns. See id. at 467. A relaxation
of the standard of judicial review would likely cause: a) domination of agency decision making by
special interest groups; b) improper political influence on agency decision making; c) agency
imposition of idiosyncratic values via its regulatory decisions. See id. at 467, 481.
183. Id. at491.
184. Id. at 478-79. Such a situation was addressed by the courts when the Reagan administration,
in an effort to limit Social Security Disability Payments, influenced the SSA (Social Security
Administration) to adopt a review program which encouraged ALJs (Administrative Law Judges) to
deny more claims. Id. at 469. In that instance, there was not a statement or piece of legislation to be
evaluated by the courts, which through judicial review had to scrutinize every fact finding-in the
specific case, thousands of petitions for review. Id. at 469-70. With regard to agencies, amongst
them the INS, FBI, or IRS, which regulate vital sectors from the public perspective but which can
potentially infringe on important aspects of the private life, it is therefore evident that there is a need
to maintain an adequate role for Courts as a counterbalance to agency discretion and potential abuse.
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case that Congress has not provided for force of law, it is the Court itself that
recognizes that a complete de novo review by the court is not feasible, and
an intermediate level of review is appropriate. For example, the Court
considered that:
Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmore's holding that an
agency's interpretation may merit some deference whatever its
form, given the 'specialized experience and broader investigation
and information' available to the agency.... There is room
at least to raise a Skidmore claim here, where the regulatory
scheme is highly detailed .... A classification ruling in this situation
may therefore at least seek a respect proportional to the power to
persuade. '85
Furthermore, as elucidated by the court in Pesquera Mares Australes
Ltda.,86 in accordance with Mead Corp., there are situations in which even
though no formal procedure is provided, an agency's specialized expertise in
"complex and complicated matters" and the precedential value of its
decisions, justify the accordance of Chevron deference.' 87
As to Justice Scalia's statement that Skidmore is a "truism and a trifling
statement of the obvious," even if the Skidmore test certainly involves very
fact intensive determinations, it also requires a balancing of factors such as
that done by the courts in many other important and settled areas of the
law.' 88  This balancing is considered an expression of the longstanding
tradition of the American legal system and of the role and functions of the
judicial power in managing the administration ofjustice.' 9 Furthermore, the
specialized experience of an agency in administering a statutory scheme can
be very influential in the persuasiveness determination, thereby considerably
185., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35 (2001) (citation omitted).
186. 266 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
187. Id. at 1379-8 1. This case involved the review of a decision of the Department of Commerce
determining dumping margin for imports of Atlantic fresh salmon from Chile. The court considered
as a very important factor, which is relevant under Mead Corp., that the precedential nature of
agency determinations, while not sufficient to "'add up to Chevron entitlement' ... militates in favor
of the application of Chevron." Id. (citing Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 218).
188. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 250-251 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 250-51. Examples of such areas are the personal jurisdiction determination involving
minimum contacts analysis, the forum non-conveniens, and the choice of law analysis. Furthermore
the Mead Corp. decision also provides adequate guidance on the application of the Skidmore test, as
opposed to the decision in Christensen, where the judges-although agreeing on the outcome-
were split on the meaning of the Skidmore test. See id. at 255-56. Certainly, the Court does not
seem to agree with Justice Breyer's interpretation in Christensen that Skidmore is a part of step two
of Chevron, and seems to take an approach more similar to that of Justice Stevens. Id.
limiting the courts' freedom to disregard the agency's ruling. This is
evidenced by the court's decision in Heartland By-Products, Inc.,' 90
involving the review of a ruling letter by the Customs' service, where the
court held that an appropriate consideration of the agency's specialized
expertise and of its reasoning, "lends further persuasiveness to its ruling."''9
B. Indirect Impact on Agencies'Activities: Increased Transparency
The Supreme Court's decision in Mead Corp. not only has a direct
effect on the courts' powers of supervision, but it also indirectly promotes a
heightened level of transparency in administrative action as well.
In fact, the debate about Agency discretion "subsume[s] more particular
issues such as the extent to which agencies can set policy, the freedom of
agencies to deviate from established policy in particular circumstances, and
whether discretion is plenary, rather than subject to supervision by other
institutions."'' 92  Furthermore, the tension between the rule of law and
regulatory flexibility is not new. 193  These issues are interconnected, with
one influencing the other, and thus the elimination of "all review of agency
decisions formally would allow the agency complete freedom to set policy
and deviate from it."'
' 94
Therefore, the Court's decision in Mead Corp., while directly increasing
the power of the courts to supervise administrative action, indirectly affects
the power to set policy and to deviate from such policy, as it requires the
agencies to show the persuasiveness of the outcome that they reach and
thereby forces these agencies to increase the transparency of their action.
190. Heartland By-Products, Inc. v. United States, 264 F.3d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
191. Id. at 1136. This case involved the review of a ruling letter issued by the Customs' Service,
which modified previous decisions and reclassified Heartland's sugar syrup under 1702.90.10
HTSUS or 1702.90.20 of the HTSUS. Id.. at 1130. The court considered the specialized experience
of the Customs Service in determining the classification of goods as determinative in assessing the
persuasiveness of the Customs' Service under the Skidmore Test. See id. at 1136. Furthermore, the
court reasoned that the revocation of the prior ruling was not controlling because the Customs
Service has the power to revoke a prior classification of goods. Id. Thus, inconsistency with a prior
ruling was not in itselfa basis for denying all deference to a revocation ruling. See id. Furthermore,
in reviewing an informal classification decision of the Customs Service, the court in Four Seasons
Produce, Inc. v. United States further stressed the importance of the Customs Service's specialized
experience in the Skidmore persuasiveness determination because "with the classification of
merchandise, Customs can be said to possess the kind of 'experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance,' and can bring the benefit of specialized
experience to bear the subtle question of' valuation." Four Seasons Produce, Inc. v. United States,
No. 99-03-00142, 2001 WL 1636977, at *7 (Ct. Int'l. Trade, Dec. 20, 2001) (citing Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 234)).
192. See Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 432.
193. Id. at 436.
194. Id. at 432.
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Ex post facto review of agency decisions, whether performed by
Congress, the legislature, or the courts, has a huge impact on agencies both
from the operational and from the financial perspective. 95 Notably, it forces
an agency to collect relevant amounts of information that often is not used
by the agency and "to devote a vast quantity of resources to formalities of
explanation in order for the agency's policy to survive judicial...
review.' 96  Critics of increased ex post facto review claim that it has
resulted in the "ossification" of the rulemaking process, and advocate that
agencies be relieved of the "need to persuade reviewers of the wisdom of the
agency policy."' 97
However, as currently practiced, process review is a crucial element in
ensuring that administrative regulations are in pursuit of "the public interest
embodied in the public's understanding and acceptance of the bases for
agencies' authority."' 98  It evaluates the reasons the agency gives for its
action, considers the alternative solutions that were rejected by the agency,
and judges the persuasiveness of the choice, therefore indirectly limiting and
reviewing "improper interest group influence, undue political influence, and
biases that derive from idiosyncratic staff cultures."' 99 On this point, the
Court's decision in Mead Corp. seems to find an adequate balance, allowing
the courts to judge the persuasiveness of the agency's decision but still
mandating an appropriate consideration of the "'specialized experience and
broader investigations and information"' available to the agency.200
In Mead Corp., the Court noted that "most ruling letters contain little or
no reasoning, but simply describe goods and state the appropriate category
and tariff. Few letters set out a rationale for the determination. 20' This
particular consideration clearly shows how the present decision will force an
agency, in this case the Customs Service, to makes its decisional process
195. Id. at 457-58.
196. Id. at 457. See also Shep Melnick, Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN.
L. REV. 245, 247 (1992) (discussing how uncertainty in standards of judicial review has led to a huge
increase of records and length in the rulemaking process).
197. Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 458 (citing Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on
"Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385-86 (1992) (considering that
heightened judicial review leads agencies to prepare for "worst case scenarios," thus constituting an
"exceedingly time-consuming and resource-intensive" effort)). See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven
Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 65 (1995) (advocating that the simple
notice and comment process has been complicated by the courts that caused the "ossification" of
rulemaking).
198. Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 493.
199. Id. at491.
200. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 234 (quoting Chevron, 323 U.S. at 139).
201. Id. at 224.
more transparent. On the other hand, such requirements will also constitute
a burden on the agency as well, even while it serves the important purpose of
rendering the administrative action more comprehensible, transparent, and
legitimate in the eyes of consumers, entrepreneurs, and citizens in general-
all of whom are regularly affected by administrative action.20 2
Furthermore, the Court individuated in Mead Corp. that Congressional
delegation of power to rule through formal adjudication or notice and
comment rulemaking constitute "[a] very good indicator of delegation
meriting Chevron deference. 20 3 However, the want of that procedure is not
determinative because the Court "[h]as sometimes found reasons for
Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality was required
and none was afforded., 20 4 From the standpoint of the analysis of the impact
of the decision on the transparency of the administrative action, the presence
of the "escape clause" is extremely important. In fact, in borderline cases,
before a determination has been made by the Supreme Court (or by
Congress) as to whether Chevron deference is appropriate, even absent
formal adjudication or notice and comment rulemaking, agencies will
probably be led to shape their action and their decision in order to meet the
stricter Skidmore test. It is evident, therefore, that administrative
transparency will be promoted not only in those cases clearly falling within
the Skidmore realm of application, but also in those borderline cases where
delegation of power to rule with force of law falls within the "escape clause"
of the Mead Corp. decision.
C. The "Burden of Proof' Shift
The most extensive impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Mead
Corp. will probably be a result of the shift in the burden of proving
delegation of power to rule with force of law. The Court provided that
agency authority to rule with force of law is no longer presumed, but instead
must be positively proved by the agency before Chevron deference is
warranted and "may be shown in a variety of ways.20 5
In Chevron, the Court held that after a court determines that a statute
was silent or ambiguous on an issue, that court should give strong deference
to the agency's construction of the statute, and overturn only if it was an
20impermissible construction. 06 In contract with Chevron, the normative
framework in Mead Corp. is such that the burden is on the agency to prove
that Congress delegated to the agency the authority to make rulings carrying
202. Id. at 237-38.
203. Id. at 219.
204. Id. at 231.
205. Id. at 227.
206. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
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the force of law.20 7 Justice Scalia's strong dissent is especially grounded in
the consideration of the strong impact which such a shift in the presumption
will have.
20 8
The important effects related to the shift in presumption are clearly
shown by the Mead Corp. decision itself. In fact, the case was remanded to
the lower court due to the fact that "the ruling at issue ... fails to qualify."20 9
It is clear that the agency, rather than the opposing party, failed to meet the
burden of proof, which successfully showed that no Chevron deference was
appropriate. Therefore, in borderline cases-those that are more likely to be
disputed in court-the shift in the burden of proof will have its biggest
impact. Frequently, this will cause Skidmore and not Chevron deference to
apply because the agency cannot meet the threshold burden of proving
Congressional delegation of power to issue decisions carrying the force of
law. The extended reach of such burden of proof shift was clear in Hall v.
U.S. E.P.A., 10 where the court determined, against the EPA's arguments to
the contrary, that Chevron deference was not due to the EPA's interpretation
of the Clean Air Act, which had approved revisions to county's air quality
plan modifying rules governing new stationary sources. 21 ' Applying the
Skidmore test, the court then concluded that the EPA's decision was not
persuasive because "the EPA ha[d] not offered any explanation of how the
interpretation fits within the statutory scheme that the EPA administers or
reflects the EPA's considered policy judgment about how best to administer
the Act."'2 1 2  The important effect of the shift in the burden of proof was
207. See Mead Corp, 533 U.S. at 227-28.
208. Id. at 245 (Scalia, J., dissenting). What before had been a general presumption of authority
on the part of the agencies to interpret the statutes that they administer was changed to a presumption
of no such authority, which may be overcome only by a showing of affirmative legislative intent to
the contrary. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In addition, when before agency authority to resolve
ambiguity did not exist, the court did not have to give any deference to the agency, while now it
must give this indeterminate amount of deference under Skidmore. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). In
deciding the instant case, Justice Scalia would adhere to the original formulation of Chevron and
therefore, absent congressional intent to the contrary, found that Chevron deference should be given
to the Customs Service's interpretation of the HTSUS. Id. at 252 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 227.
210. Hall v. United States E.P.A., 273 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 42 USCA § 7410 (1970)).
211. Id.at1156-57.
212. Id. It is important to note that the court, in deciding whether to remand for further
consideration in accordance with the opinion, expressly recognized the limits and separation of the
respective institutional roles stating that
in light of the limited record before us and our circumscribed view of the broader context
of pollution reduction efforts in which this case arises, we are well aware of the limits of
our own ability to fashion an appropriate remedy. That task remains for the EPA, in the
first instance.
further made clear in the Matz decision, where the Court, after according
Chevron deference to an informal decision contained in an amicus brief filed
by the Internal Revenue Service, held on remand (after Mead Corp. was
decided) that Chevron deference was not warranted because delegation of
power to rule with force of law was not proved by the agency.213
This constitutes an increased encouragement to dispute agency decisions
because in the most controversial cases, the presumption, analogous to Matz,
will dictate the outcome as to the applicable standard of review. It is
evident, therefore, that the shift in the burden of proof will probably lead to
an increase the amount of litigation and the dispute of agency decisions, thus
creating a friendlier environment for plaintiffs involved in such disputes, and
increasing the cases of remand and reversal of agency decisions.21 4
D. The "Escape Clause"
After formulating its general rule, the Supreme Court in Mead Corp.
provided for the existence of what can be defined as an "escape clause." In
fact, after finding in the specific case that no Chevron deference was
warranted because no rule and comment or formal adjudication authority
was granted to the Customs Service's ruling letter at issue, the Court held
that:
The want of that procedure here does not decide the case, for we
have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no
such administrative formality was required and none was
afforded .... The fact that the tariff classification here was not a
Id. at 1164.
213. In Matz v. Household Intern. Tax Reduction Inv. Plan, the court, on remand from the
Supreme Court, held that the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) position contained in the amicus brief
submitted in an ERISA action that both vested and non-vested plan participants were required to be
counted in determining whether a partial termination of the ERISA plan occurred was an informal
agency policy pronouncement not entitled to Chevron deference. Matz v. Household Intern. Tax
Reduction Inv. Plan, 265 F.3d 572, 574-75 (7th Cir. 2001). The Court reasoned that although in the
past it had held that the same informal rulings deserved Chevron deference, on remand and pursuant
to Mead Corp., the Court concluded that a different outcome was justified. Id. The Court found that
it only deserved Skidmore deference according to its persuasiveness because such informal decision
is analogous to "opinion letters, policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines,
[which] are entitled to respect only to the extent that those interpretations have the power to persuade
pursuant to Skidmore." Id. Thus, it is clear from the Matz decision that Mead Corp. has a very
important impact on judicial deference because it has resulted in the courts according Skidmore
deference in cases where Chevron deference had previously been applied. Id.
214. This conclusion is particularly sustained a contrariis from the fact that after Chevron,
affirmation rate increased by almost fifteen percent, and remands and reversals declined forty
percent. See Rossi, supra note 2, at 1115. Indirectly, the increase in litigation will result in higher
administrative costs for the agencies, both in financial terms and also in terms of the human
resources to be devoted to such task.
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product of such formal process does not alone, therefore, bar the
application of Chevron.2t 5
The Court will accord Chevron deference in the absence of such formal
procedures when analogous delegation is shown "by some other indication
of a comparable congressional intent. ' '2 16 The presence of such an "escape
clause" is appropriate in light of the multifarious variety of administrative
agencies, and because of the different duties and powers that they enjoy. It
has recently been used by the court in Fontana v. Caldera to accord Chevron
deference to an informal adjudication decision issued by the Army Board for
Correction of Military Records (ABCMR).217 However, the risk of its future
abuse is great, possibly leading to the guarantee of Chevron deference too
liberally when political or other contingent reasons require it. Such abuse
would greatly reduce the forseeability of the standard of review, thereby
causing a relaxation in the application of the general framework rule
provided in Mead Corp.2 ' However, as it is correctly shown in American
Federation of Government Employees v. Rumsfeld,2 19 this does not mean that
courts could not accord a particular and heightened degree of deference
under Skidmore to agencies' determinations in fields related to national
215. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 230-31.
216. Id. at 227.
217. See Fontana, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 128. In the Fontana case, the ABCMR informally decided
that two Army physicians did not complete Active Duty Service Obligation (ADSO) in return for
undergraduate education at the United States Military Academy at West Point while they attended
medical school at Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences (USUHS). Id. at 131-132. The
court reasoned that Chevron deference was appropriate even in absence of formal adjudication
because 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1) grants discretion to the Secretary of a Military Department to correct
any military record "when the Secretary considers it necessary to correct an error or remove an
injustice." 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1)(1956). Furthermore, the corrections "shall be made under
procedures established by the Secretary concerned. Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(3) (1956)).
Most importantly, '[e]xcept when procured by fraud, a correction under this section is final and
conclusive on all officers of the United States."' Id. at 128(citing 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(4)(1956)).
218. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 231-32. The court then held that the Customs ruling letter at issue
failed to qualify for Chevron deference under the "escape clause" as well because the letter
presented a case far removed not only from notice and comment and formal adjudication, but also
"from any other circumstances reasonably suggesting that Congress ever thought of classification
rulings as deserving the deference claimed for them here." Id. at 237. The Court reasoned that even
though the ruling letters may have some precedential value, any precedential claim of a classification
ruling letter "is counterbalanced by the provision for independent review of Customs classifications
by the CIT." Id. at 232; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (1930); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2638-2640 (1980)
(providing for independent review of Customs classifications by the CIT). Therefore, in future case,
the Court might accord Chevron deference when faced with rulings having some precedential value
and no independent judicial review is provided. However, as this case clearly demonstrates, this
depends on the circumstances surrounding the determination.
219. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Rumsfeld, 262 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2001).
security. For example, in the Rumsfeld case, after determining that the
purpose of the Arsenal Act was to "preserv[e] the government's in-house
military production capabilities", the court held that the Secretary of the
Army's informal decision to contract with private parties for the production
of tank gun mounts for the upgraded M IA2 Abrams tank and the
development of the Lightweight 155mm ("LW155"), without first
undertaking a cost analysis did not violate the Act. 220 The court reasoned
that "[c]onsistent Army practice [and] legislative history" excepts such a
decision from the requirement of the Arsenal Act, and therefore the Arsenal
Act "does not affect the ability to award supply contracts to particular
suppliers ... to maintain their availability in the event of national emergency
or industrial mobilization. 22'
However, in light of the increasing demand for heightened national
security, it is reasonably foreseeable that in the future, the "escape clause"
might enjoy a liberal application in connection with decisions of the
agencies that are involved in the efforts to protect our Country.222 Such use
would be necessary in order to accord Chevron deference for decisions not
involving notice and comment or informal rulemaking authority, but that for
reasons of national security, need strong deference. Justice Scalia perceived
the importance of this issue in Mead. Corp, and he posed the question(even
if indirectly), and the use of this clause seems to give a reasonable answer to
the activity of those agencies that for reasons of security necessarily cannot
provide that level of transparency required to other agencies. 23
Furthermore, the "escape clause" seems particularly suited to answer
Scalia's concerns, as it is capable of being used to allow Chevron deference
to decisions made by high-level officers and when a statutory scheme is
enforced by an agency with highly specialized expertise in a particular
field. 224 Following Mead, the Court in TeamBank v. McClure225 has found
220. Id. at 662-63 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 4532 (1956)).
221. Id. at 658, 661, 668. Notably, the persuasiveness of the Secretary of the Army's position was
also endorsed by a "landmark decision of the Comptroller General." Id. at 661.
222. The dernand for an increased level of national security that arose after the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks not only impacted the following weeks, but also involved a relevant increase
in state and federal budget devoted to agencies with police-like powers. In fact, U.S. Attorney
General John Ashcroft and White House Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge "are pledging a
tenfold increase in federal subsidies to police for antiterrorism." Robert Dreyfuss, The Cops are
Watching You: September I/ Is Being Used As a Reason to Build Up Police Intelligence Units, THE
NATION, June 3, 2002. With the unfolding of the permanent war on terrorism, "a decade may pass
before the trauma of September II wears off and the pendulum begins to swing back." Id..
223. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 244 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
224. See id. at 244. This issue is closely connected to the issue of national security, and one of the
principal areas of application is likely to be seen in the wiretapping decisions issued by the U.S.
Attorney General. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1970) (requiring all wiretapping decisions to be authorized
by "[t]he Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney
General.").
225. TeamBank v. McClure, 279 F.3d 614 (8th Cir. 2002).
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appropriate the use of the "escape clause" for decisions issued by the
Comptroller of the Currency, in light of the extent to which such agency "is
charged with the enforcement of banking laws. 226
The impact and strength of the Court's decision in Mead Corp. will be
measurable in the future according to the capacity of the Supreme Court, and
of all other Federal and State courts, to guarantee that the use of the "escape
clause" is not abused in cases involving national security. In fact, such an
abuse would significantly diminish the supervisory powers of courts and the
transparency of the administrative action in such a sensitive field, thereby
significantly diminishing individual guarantees in those cases where
constitutional individual rights are at stake. However, in light of the national
emergency following the September 1 th attacks and the increased demand
for national security, it is possible, foreseeable, and to a reasonable level
appropriate, that transparency be sacrificed in the name of a higher level of
security.
E. Mead Corp's Indirect Impact on the Relationship Between the Charming
Betsy Canon and the Chevron Doctrine
Limiting the realm of application of the Chevron doctrine, the Court's
decision in Mead Corp. indirectly influences the relationship between the
domestic and the international legal systems. In fact, it provides a clearer
definition of the situations in which a judicial interpretation of a statute in
conformity with an international obligation under the Charming Besty
Canon trumps an agency's statutory interpretation that is inconsistent with
such international obligation.
The Charming Besty Canon is a rule of statutory construction that arose
out of a decision rendered by the United States Supreme Court in the early
1800s in which it held that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed
226. Id. at 619 n.5. In this case, TeamBank sought the approval of its merger with First National
Bank from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency OCC). Id. at 616. The Director of the
Finance Division of the State of Missouri notified the OCC of its opposition to the merger because it
was allegedly found to violate Missouri law. Id. In June 2000, the OCC approved the proposed
merger, thus rejecting the State of Missouri's argument. See id. Thereafter, Teambank initiated
action seeking declaratory judgment of the legality of the merger. Id. at 617. The Court in
TeamBank found that the OCC's determination was not entitled to Chevron deference because it was
not issued by notice and comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. See id. at 619. However,
applying the "escape clause" in Mead Corp., the Court determined that the decision of the OCC
deserved Chevron deference in light of its expertise and of the fact that the OCC was accorded such
deference by the Court in Nationsbank. See Id. (citing Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 234-35;
Nationsbank ofN.C., 513 U.S. 251,256-57(1995).
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.
' 2 7
The application of such canon of statutory interpretation and construction
has posed the problem of defining the relationship between the Chevron
doctrine and the Charming Besty Canon when an agency gives an
interpretation of a statute contrary to an international obligation. In a
situation such as this, the court on the one hand has the obligation under
Chevron to defer to an agency's reasonable statutory interpretation, while on
the other, under the Charming Besty Canon, the Court is bound to provide a
statutory interpretation consonant with the international obligations of the
United States.
As to this point, the Court in DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast
Trade Council2 8 provided a rule of constitutional avoidance indicating that
statutes should always be construed, where possible, so that they do not
violate the Constitution, and held that this rule trumps the Chevron
doctrine.129  The Court of International Trade and some authors have
interpreted this decision to mean that the Charming Besty Canon trumps the
Chevron doctrine; however, this outcome is highly debated because it is
both partly based on the use of a sentence that was not present in the
Charming Besty decision, and because the Court in DeBartolo only
indirectly addressed this issue.23 °
Therefore, considering the difficulty in reconciling the contemporaneous
application of the two doctrines, the Court's decision in Mead Corp., to the
extent that it limits the use of Chevron deference for agency's decisions,
indirectly decreases the potential for collision between the Chevron doctrine
and the Charming Besty Canon. Thus, it allows the Charming Besty Canon
227. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
228. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Bld'g & Constr. Coast Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
229. Id. at 575. See also Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L.
REV. 649, 685-90 (2000); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 2271, 2279 (2001) (holding that if an otherwise
acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, and an alternative
interpretation of the statute is fairly possible, the court is obligated to construe the statute in order to
avoid such problems).
230. Notably, in NRLB v. Catholic Bishop ojChicago, the Court, referring to Justice Marshall's
statement in The Schooner Charming Betsv case, misstated the rule as set forth therein, holding that
"an Act of Congress ought not be construed to violate the Constitution if any other possible
construction remains available." NRLB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979).
However, Charming Bets v referred to the "law of nations," rather than to the "Constitution." The
Court again repeated such a misstated citation in DeBartolo, holding that the constitutional
avoidance canon trumps the Chevron doctrine. Consequently, the CIT has held on several occasions
that the Supreme Court had concluded that the Charming Betsy Canon trumps the Chevron doctrine.
See BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 200 nn. 4-5
(2001) (citing Hyundai Elecs. Co. v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1344 (Ct. Int'l. Trade
1999). Cf Ronald A. Brand, Direct Effect of international Economic Law in the United States and
Eoropean Union, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 556, 571 N.76 (1996-97) (stating that the Supreme Court
has taken the position that the Chevron rule of deference to agency interpretations of congressional
intent is secondary to the Charming Betsy doctrine).
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to trump more easily an agency's interpretation of a statute that is contrary to
an international obligation because judicial bodies will more often face
agency decisions that will be subject to the "weak deference" of Skidmore as
opposed to the strong deference in Chevron.
Thus, it is evident that the Court's decision in Mead Corp. guarantees
and promotes a broader consonance of the domestic legal system of the
United States with its international obligations and the development and
respect of the Law of Nations.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court decision in Mead Corp. is very
incisive and presents various ramifications and fields of impact. Although at
first view the strongest impact is represented by the creation of an
intermediate standard of review between de novo and Chevron deference, it
also promotes administrative transparency, places on the agencies the burden
of proving congressional delegation of power to issue decisions carrying
force of law, and significantly contributes to the development of a body of
law that is consonant to international obligations.
However, its strength will best be measured with time because the
political environment can potentially and relevantly affect its incisiveness,
especially in present times, where an increased demand for national security
favors a higher effectiveness of the agencies' activity thus possibly requiring
a decreased transparency and a lower level of scrutiny by the judiciary.
In this struggle between increased security and transparency, the weight
of the Court's decision in Mead Corp. will be determined according to the
capacity of the courts to guarantee that the use of the "escape clause" does
not deprive the general rule of Skidmore deference of its importance and
effectiveness.
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